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I. INTRODUCTION
eenagers in the United States are having sex.' Sexual expression
2
is an essential component of healthy human development;

sixty-three percent of the American public believes that

adolescent sexual exploration is a natural part of growing up? Indeed, four
out of five people first engage in sexual intercourse as teenagers

I Setting to one side the moral and political debate about the appropriateness of
teenage sexual activity, according to a recent study conducted by Dr. Robert W.
Blum, director of the Division of General Pediatrics and Adolescent Health at the
University of Minnesota, "17 percent ofanational sample ofthousands of seventhand eighth-graders said that they had had intercourse." Anne Jarrell, The Face of
Teenage Sex Grows Younger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,2000, at 4 9 (Sunday Styles), at
1. Moreover, the earlier onset of puberty adds to the growing number of young
sexual initiates. The average age of menarche has dropped to around twelve or
thirteen years. D. Malpolm Potts, Adolescence and Puberty: An Overview, in
ADOLESCENCE AND PUBERTY 269,270 (John Bancroft & June Machover Reinisch
eds., 1990). Though perhaps emotionally unprepared, adolescents are physically
ready to initiate sexual activity at a very young age. This all-time low means that
a greater proportion of teenage girls are at risk of becoming pregnant than in
previous years. Seventy-eight percent of teen pregnancies are not planned. THE
ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., TEEN SEX AND PREGNANcY (1999), http://www.agiusa.org/pubs/fbteen_sex.html. The consequences of adolescent pregnancy and
childbearing are serious. When compared with their peers who delay childbearing,
teenage mothers are less likely to graduate from high school and more likely to be
"poor while in their 20s and early 30s." Id. "Children born to teenage mothers are
more likely to suffer severe health problems, and are less likely to receive adequate
health care.... [They are also] more likely to drop out of high school." THE ANNIE
E. CASEY FOUND., WHEN TEENS HAVE SEX: ISSUES AND TRENDS (1998),
http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/teen/news/fact.htm. Financial loss to society is also
substantial; teen pregnancy and childbearing cost the nation an estimated seven
billion dollars annually. Id;
2See PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE (13th ed. 1992).
3Public Supportfor Sexuality EducationReaches HighestLevel, Survey Says,
SHOP TALK (Sexuality Info. and Educ. Council of the U.S., New York, N.Y.), June
11, 1999, at http://www.siecus.org/pubs/shop/volume4/shpv40022.html.
4
THEALAN GUTTMACHERINST., supranote 1. Another recent study found that
"more than half of the females and three-quarters of the males ages 15 to 19 have
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For boys, the average age at which they begin to have sexual intercourse is significantly younger than for girls: for boys, the average age is
thirteen and one-half to fourteen and one-half and for girls, the average age
is fifteen and one-half.5 Research, furthermore, indicates that the face of
teen sex is growing younger.' A recent press release from The Children's
Hospital ofPhiladelpla reports that thirty percent of students entering the
sixth grade already have had sexual intercourse.7
Although a majority of adults believe that adolescent sexual expenmentationis normal,' the increasmglyyouthful face ofteen sex is alarming.
As a result, abstinence education initiatives are fast becoming commonplace across the country "In the last two years, the federal government and
various states have co-funded 698 new programs." President-elect George
W. Bush has even taken the abstinence issue to the campaign trail, pledging
to "elevate abstinence education from an afterthought to an urgent
priority."'" The programs vary widely in content, but federal funding is
experiencedsexual mtercourse."Ron Stodghillll, Where dYouLearn That?, TIME,
June5 15, 1998, at 52, 55.
Analysis: Teen Attitudes Toward Sex and Sexual Identity (National Public
Radio, Talk of the Nation, Apr. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 21458775 (citing Dr. Robert
Blum, director of the Division of General Pediatrics and Adolescent Health at the
Umversity of Minnesota, who specializes in teen sexuality).
6 S ee Jarrell, supra note 1. "There are no m-depth studies showing national
[among] middle school [students], ages 10 to 13." Id.
trends m sexual activity
According to Dr. Robert W Blum, director of the Division of General Pediatrics
and Adolescent Health at the Umversity of Minnesota, the lack of studies derives
the outcry from
from political and privacy interests. See id. Researchers "fear
politicians who embrace an abstinence-only message and from parents wanting to
protect their children's privacy." Id. Existing studies of national trends look only
at high school students. Id. These studies show a "striking drop decade by decade
m the age at which teenagers first engage in intercourse." Id.
ADecember 1999 study by the National Center on Addiction and Substance
Abuse at Columbia Umversity m New York noted that in the early 1970s,
less than 5 percent of 15-year-old girls and 20 percent of 15-year-old boys
had engaged in sexual intercourse. By 1997, the figures were 38 percent for
girls, 45 percent for boys.
Id.
INews Release, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, Sex Among Young
Teens Closely Tied to PeerNorms, Says Pediatrician at The Children's Hospital of
Philadelphia (June 27,2000), http://www.pmewswire.com/nmicro/CHOP
I See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
9The Naked Truth, NEwSWEEK, May 8, 2000, at 58.
1l Jodie Morse, PreachingChastity in the Classroom,TIME, Oct. 18, 1999, at
79, 79. As Governor of Texas, Bush spent six million dollars on abstinence
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contingent on educating children about "the 'harmful psychological and
physical effects' of premarital sex."' Federal legislation does not mandate
discussion of contraceptives, but any discussion on the topic must cast
m preventing pregnancy and sexually
contraceptives as unreliable
12
diseases.
transmitted

programs. As presidential candidate, Bush pledged to allocate $135 million on
abstinence education if elected president. Id. The abstinence-only approach gamed
support m 1996 with G.O.P welfare-reform legislation, which set aside fifty
million dollars over five years for states adopting the "just-say-no" perspective. Id.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 710(b)(2) (West Supp. 2000), for a listing of eight specific
elements that, together, define the abstinence education that grantees must provide.
Program implementation began m October 1997; state maternal and child health
iureaus, in conjunction with governors' offices, are adminstenng the federal
funds. PLANNEDPARENTHOODFED'NOF AMERICA, INC., HELPING YOUNG PEOPLE
TO DELAY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (1997), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/

library/TEEN-PREGNANCY/HelpYoung.html. According to a study by the
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the U.S., approximately 700
schools and community groups in forty-eight states are participating in the
program. Morse, supra, at 79.
" Morse, supra note 10, at 79.
1 2Id. "Abstinence advocates claim credit for a [national] decline m teen pregnancies, down 17% from 1990 to 1996.
"Id. at 80. Published evaluations of
these programs, however, "did not find a delay in the onset of sexual intercourse"
among teens. Id. The Alan Guttmacher Institute investigated the decline in teenage
pregnancy using data from the National Surveys of Family Growth ("NSFG"), "the
major source of government data on population and reproductive health." Rebekah
Saul, Teen Pregnancy: ProgressMeets Politics, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON
PUBLIC POLICY, June 1999, http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/joumals/gr020306.html.
The NSFG data shows that the decline in overall teenage pregnancy rates "is due
to lower pregnancy rates among sexually experienced teens." Id. Sexually active
teenagers account for 80% of the decline m pregnancy rates, wlch indicates that
these teens are leaming to use contraception more frequently and effectively. See
id.
Nevertheless, Douglas Kirby, a semor research scientist who has studied
abstinence programs for ETR Associates, a California nonprofit health-education
and research organization, remarks that "the jury is still out' and that "11 studies
show [that] programs that combine an abstinence message with information about
contraceptives either delayed teen sex or reduced its frequency." Morse, supranote
10, at 80. Although studies show that seventy-five percent ofthe decline in teenage
pregnancy resulted from more effective contraceptive use, twenty-five percent of
the decline was due to decreased sexual activity. News Release, The Alan
Guttmacher Institute, U.S. Teenage Pregnancy Rate Drops Another 4% Between

1995 and 1996 (Apr. 29, 1999), http//www.agi-usa.org/pubs/archives/newsrelease
0
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In an apparent attempt td join the ranks of the abstinence-only
movement, Illinois authorities recently employed a rarely used criminal
statute to charge a mother, Kathy Maness, for failing to prevent her
thirteen-year-old daughter from consensually engaging in sexual intercourse with the daughter's seventeen-year-oldboyfrnend.1 3The law, section
150/5.1 of the Illinois Wrongs to Children Act, required parents "who
knowingly allow[ ]or permit[ ]an act of criminal sexual abuse or criminal
sexual assault" upon their child to take "reasonable steps to prevent its
commission or future occurrences of such acts. 14 Although the daughter,
Lynlee Jo Otten, and her boyfriend, Leonard A. Owens, Jr., were both
teenagers, under Il1inois law, theboyfrlendwas committing criminal sexual
abuse because of the four-year difference in their ages."5

_teen.preg.html. Tis Article does not seek to contribute to the morally and
politically charged debate on sexuality education. Rather, it aspires to firmly
outline those areas of family life into which the state cannot tread. See mnfra Part
V
1People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545, 547 (I1. 2000). The State charged that:
[Kathy Maness,] mother of Lynlee Jo Otten, a minor under the age of 17
years, knowingly allowed or permitted Leonard A. Owens, Jr. to commit an
act of criminal sexual abuse upon Lynlee [Jo Otten], "in that Leonard A.
Owens, Jr. committed an act of sexual penetration with Lynlee Jo Otten,
who was at least 13 years of age, but under 17 years of age when the act
was committed, in that Leonard A. Owens, Jr. placed his pens in the vagina
of Lynlee Jo Otten, and Leonard A. Owens, Jr. was less than five years
older than Lynlee Jo Otten, and the defendant did fail to take reasonable
steps to prevent its commission."
Id. Leonard was seventeen years of age when he and Lynlee began dating each
other and having sexual intercourse. Id. at 548. Lynlee was twelve years of age
when the relationship began and thirteenyears of age when she and Leonard began
engaging in sexual intercourse. Id. Prosecutors could have instigated proceedings
m the Illinois juvenile court system to determine whether Maness abused or
neglected her daughter. Instead, the state opted to prosecute Maness pursuant to
section 150/5.1. See 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).
14720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15015.1 (West Supp. 2000). Although, mManess,
the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated section 150/5.1 on the grounds that it was
unconstitutionally vague, analysis of the statute remains important because any
criminal parental liability law that requires parents to discourage teenage sexual
activity would impermissibly infrnge upon parental privacy rights. See mnfra Part
V.B.
11 Section 5/12-15(c) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 provides that an
"accused commits criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual
penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but
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"At some point after the sexual relationship began, Lynlee told
her
mother that she and Leonardwere having sexual intercourse."'" Maness
initially lectured Lynlee about the implications and possible consequences
of sexual intercourse. 7 After realizing that she could not prevent Lynlee
from continuing the sexual relationslp, however, Maness then obtained
birth control pills for Lynlee. 8 Maness also repeatedly "allowed Leonard
... to spend the mght at the family home."'19 She "was aware that, on some
of these occasions, Leonard slept in Lynlee's bedroom and had sexual
intercourse with Lynlee."2 °
Maness claimed "that she did not know what steps to take to prevent
the sexual relationslp between Lynlee and Leonard." 21 She "stated that
Leonard 'was a mice boy and was better than most of the younger boys
Lynlee was hanging around with' "22; " 'itwas safer for Lynlee to be having
sex with [Leonard] at home than [with] somebody else out of the home
environment.' "2 Maness felt that she had "some control" over her
daughter's sexual activity if it occurred at home. 24
under 17 years of age and the accused was less than 5 years older than the victim."
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000). Leonard pleaded guilty

to misdemeanor criunal sexual abuse pursuant to section 5/12-15(d). Maness,732
N.E.2d
at 548.
6
1 Maness, 732N.E.2d at548. Lynlee andLeonardbegan dating mAugust 1996
and began engaging in sexual intercourse in December 1996. Id. Apparently,
Lynlee had had other sexual relationships prior to becoming involved with
Leonard. No evidence, however, indicates that Kathy Maness was aware that
Lynlee was sexually active prior to her relationship with Leonard. Brief for
Appellee at 7 n.2, People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (111.2000) (No. 86463).
17 Maness, 732 N.E.2d at 548.

18 Id.
1Id.Leonard spent the mght at the Maness home twenty or thirty times. Brief
for Appellee
at 5, People
732 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 2000) (No. 86463).
20 Maness, 732 N.E.2dv.atManess,
548. When Leonard stayed at the Maness home, he
would, at times, sleep on a chair m the living room. Brieffor Appellee at 5, People
v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (111.2000) (No. 86463). At other times, he would stay
in Lynlee's bedroom. Id.When he and Lynlee engaged in sexual intercourse, they
usually did so m Lynlee's bedroom and usually while Mr. and Mrs. Maness were
in the house. Maness, 732 N.E.2d at 552. Durng their nme-month relationship,
Lynlee and Leonard had sexual intercourse fifteen to twenty times. Id. at 548.
2 Maness, 732 N.E.2d at 548. This statement
was taken from an investigative
report from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. Id.
' Id.Leonard is the cousm of the prosecuting county's State's Attorney Brief
for Appellee at 6, People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 2000) (No. 86463).
23 Maness, 732 N.E.2d at 548 (alteration m original).
2

Id.
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As a result ofManess's prosecution, the Illinois Supreme Court had the
opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the criminal parental
liability statute.'s On June 15, 2000, a divided Illinois Supreme Court
dismissed the charge and struck down the law that allowed it, holding the
statute unconstitutionally vague.26 The court concluded that, because ofthe
lack of direction in the statute and in its legislative history, parents have no
way of knowing whether their actions meet the law's requirement to take
"reasonable steps" to prevent criminal sexual abuse.27 The court also held
I Maness challenged the law on various grounds, including vagueness and
infringement of privacy rights. Id. At the circuit court level, Maness moved to
dismiss, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague with respect to what
constitutes "reasonable steps" to prevent the commission of future acts of sexual
abuse and that the statute violated her "fundamental liberty right to raise her child
free from undue state influence as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution." Id.
She contended that the statute exposed any parent "to prosecution if a child
becomes pregnant, sires a child, asks for birthcontrol devices, or seeks any counsel
from the teenager's parents regarding sexual activity." Id.
Ruling from the bench, the circuit court granted Maness's motion to disnss the
charge, finding "that section 150/5.1 'may inplicate first amendment concerns of
the defendant or of a parent or guardian to effectively address the problem of
underage teenage sex in their particular family situation.'" Id. The circuit court
also held that section 150/5.1 was "unconstitutionally vague as to what constitutes
'reasonable steps' to prevent the commission of future acts of sexual abuse." Id.
The State appealed the circuit court's ruling directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Id.
I Id. at 551. Justice Bilandic delivered the opinon of the court. Id. at 546.
Clef Justice Harrison, joined by Justices Miller and McMorrow, dissented from
the majority opinion. Id. at 551-53.
27I The dissent, however, argued thatthe statute's prohibition was sufficiently
definite and that Maness's alleged actions fell clearly within the confines of section
150/5.1.Id.at 551-52. ClhefJustice Harrson conceded thatManess had confronted
the couple about their activities and expressed her disapproval. Id. at 552. The
Clef Justice went on, however, to protest Maness's actions in facilitating the
cnmmal sexual abuse by allowing Leonard to sleep with Lynlee in Lynlee's
bedroom. Id. Recognizing that Maness thought that her actions ensured a safer
environment for her daughter's sexual activity, the dissent, nevertheless, argued
that "[a]ny person of ordinary intelligence would understand that such conduct
constitutes a failure to take 'reasonable steps' to prevent criminal sexual abuse
within the meaning of the law." Id. at 552-53. The dissent also took issue with the
majority's finding that the statute's requirement of "reasonable steps" was vague,
pointing out that a reasonableness standard "has been employed successfully in
many other areas of the law," citing tort law as one example. Id. at 551-52.
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that section 150/5.1 "risks arbitrary and discrimmatory enforcement"
it lacks any standards to guide authorities charged with applying
because
28
it.

Although the Illinois law is no longer valid, the statute remains
important because other states may seek to use it as a template for creating
similar criminal parental liability legislation. Even in Illinois, lawmakers
are likely to revitalize the parental responsibility law 29 -the General
Assembly can redraft the statute to eliminate any ambiguities. The privacy
concerns raised by the statute, however, are not as easily cured. Criminal
parental liability laws that require parents to discourage teenage sexual
activity present a dangerous threat to parental privacy rights. 0 The Illinois
statute regulated parental decisions with respect to how to protect children
from unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases, mandating
that parents impose an abstinence standard on their minor children. By
striking section 150/5.1, the Illinois Supreme Court disposed of a law that
was arguably vague and freed Kathy Maness of the criminal charge. 31 By
declining to address Maness's argument that the statute violated her right
to privacy, however, the court overlooked the opportunity to speak to the
impact of these types of statutes on family privacy rights-a significant
issue of constitutional concern not just in Illinois, but nationwide.
The Illinois statute represents a new and disturbing development in the
recent trend toward blaming parents for the misdeeds of their children.
Parental liability laws have surged in popularity over the past decade as
lawmakers have respondedto constituents' demands to pumsh parents who
fail to control their children.32 By attempting to hold parents accountable
Additionally, the dissent declared that section 150/5.1 did not unduly mfrnge on
Maness's parental right to raise her child, reasoning that "a parent's rights [must]
yield to the state's interest in protecting its children" from abuse and neglect. Id.
at 553 (citing Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Dep't of Cent.
Mgmt. Servs., 671 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. 1996)). Implicit inthe dissent's assertion isthat
sex among teenagers is sexual abuse, a conclusion that corresponds with one ofthe
several definitions of criminal sexual abuse m section 5/12-15, and that parents
who do not take some generalized concept of appropriate measures to prevent or
discourage teenage sex are committing child abuse or neglect. Whether either
supposition is appropriate is debatable. See infra notes 223-36 and accompanying
text.28
Maness, 732 N.E.2d at 550.
50.

29See infra note

0Other problems with the statute include causation and control issues. See
mnfra Part V.B.2.b.ii. and accompanying text.
31 See supranotes 26-27
32 See infra Part Ill.A.

and accompanying text.

2000-2001]

A LrrTLE PRIVACY, PLEASE

for the consensual sexual activities of their children, however, Illinois
manipulated the typical structure of the parental liability paradigm and put
it to use in an unconventional manner.
In an attempt to dissuade other states from following Illinois's lead,
this Article highlights the futility and unconstitutionality of using parental
liability laws to address the problem of teenage sex. Teen sex occurs for
reasons other than the lack ofparental supervision and control; broad social
forces underlie the rising tide of adolescent sexual activity.3 Moreover,
privacy problems arise when states attempt to regulate parental conduct
through criminal statutes that penalize parental failures to prevent
consensual sexual intercourse among teens.34 At present, Illinois appears
to be the only state to attempt to prosecute parents who do not take
measures to stop the sexual activities of their children. Considering the
public's concern about the sexual precocity of adolescents, 3 5 however, other
states might enact legislation similar to the Illinois statute. Widespread
adoption of the Illinois approach would transform a comparatively local
privacy problem into a national one, thereby exacerbating the impact on
family pnvacy rights. Accordingly, in examining the concept of compelling
parents to prevent the sexual activity of their teenage children, this Article
places particular emphasis on section 150/5.1 of the Illinois Wrongs to
Children Act.3 6
Part Il sets forth the Illinois law.3 7 Part III compares section 150/5.1 to
traditional forms of parental responsibility statutes.3 8 This Part describes
33

See infra Part V.B.2.b.t.
I This Article does not address age-disparate sexual relationships between
young teens and adults. Significant age-differentials are beyond the scope of
chapter 720, section 5/12-15(c) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, which is
limited to adolescent parmngs between individuals who are within five years of age
of each other. See infra note 44. States typically punish sexual pamngs between
adults and minor children more severely because the greater differences in levels
of intellectual and emotional development lead to a higher risk of sexual
exploitation of the minor partner. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp.
2000) (increasing the penalty in relation to the age disparity between the parties);
720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(d) (West Supp. 2000) (imposing a greater
penalty on a perpetrator who is more than five years older than the victim when the
victim is between the ages of thirteen and sixteen).
" E.g., Jarrell, supra note 1, Morse, supra note 10; Susan Reimer, Face it:
Teens are Having Sex, FLA. TODAY, May 17, 2000, at 1, 2000 WL 20211157;
Stodghill, supra note 4.
36 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).
37 See
infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
31 See mnfra notes
56-104 and accompanying text.
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the emergence of parental responsibility laws and their recent rise in
popularity. Part IMI also argues that the current trend of holding parents
criminally liable for failure to supervise their children signals a change in
state approaches to the family and redefines the responsibilities of parents
in response to public concern about the rising juvenile crime rate. This
change in approach infringes on constitutionallyprotectedparental privacy
rights. Part IV asserts that section 150/5.1 is a variation on this familiar
theme, a sign that Illinois has joined the recently revitalized parental
accountability movement.3 9 The statute, however, takes parental responsibility to a higher level and further opens the door to state invasion of the
family home. Part V discusses the right to privacy m family matters and
argues that criminal parental liability laws that penalize parents for failing
to take reasonable steps to prevent teenage sex impermissibly interferewith
the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions. 4° This
section focuses on the Illinois statute as an exemplar of these types of laws
and attempts to explain the state interest in compelling parents to put a stop
to teenage sexual behavior. The broad swath of the parental criminal
liability statute, which condemns parents for tolerating not only sexual
exploitation, but also sexual experimentation, strains the delicate link
between state interest and objective. For this reason, these types of statutes
violate constitutional guarantees of privacy
II. THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PARENTAL RESPONSIILITY LAW:
SECTION 150/5.1
Section 150/5.1 of the Illinois Wrongs to Children Act prohibited
"permitting the sexual abuse of a child."' Section 150/5.1 provided:
A. A parent, step-parent, legal guardian, or other person having custody
of a child who knowingly allows or permits an act of criminal sexual
abuse or criminal sexual assault as defined in Section 12-13, 12-14, 1214.1, 12-15 or 12-16 ofthe Criminal Code of 1961, upon his or her child,
or knowingly permits, induces, promotes, or arranges for the child to
engage in prostitution as defined in Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code
of 1961, and fails to take reasonable steps to prevent its commission or
future occurrences of such acts commits the offense of permitting the
sexual abuse of a child. For purposes of this Section, "child" means a
minor under the age of 17 years.
39 See

infra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
oSee infra notes 134-286 and accompanying text.
41720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).
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'B. Any person convicted of permitting the sexual abuse of a child is
guilty of a Class 1 felony.42
A Class 1 felony is punishable by a maximum sentence of fifteen years'
impnsonment. 4 3
Section 5/12-15(c), the underlying provision of the cnminal sexual
abuse statute m the charge against Kathy Maness, provides that "[tlhe
accused commits crmnmal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of
sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13

42

Id.

43 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West Supp. 2000). The sentencing

range for a Class 1 felony is four to fifteen years. Id. Maness also expressed
concern that, if convicted under the statute, she could be judged a sexual
perpetrator pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. Motion to Dismiss at 2,
People v. Maness, (Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 28, 1998) (No. 97-CF-207).
The Illinois legislature, by means of the ill-fated Public Act 88-680, attempted
to amend section 150/5.1 to add "legal guardian[ ] or other person having custody
of a child" to the list of those subject to the statute. Pub. Act 88-680, art. 50, sec.
50-10, 1994 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 88-680 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Legis.
Sess.). Public Act 88-680 also sought to add a provision to include within the
statute's scope those designated who "knowingly permit[ ], induce[ ], promote[ ],
or arrange[ ] for the child to engage m prostitution as defined m Section 11-14 of
the Crnmial Code of 1961." Id. Additionally, the Act elevated the offense of
permitting sexual abuse of achild from aClass A misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony.
Id. InManess, however, the Illinois Supreme Courtfound Public Act 88-680 to be
void ab mitio "because it was enacted in violation of the single subject rule of the
Illinois Constitution." People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545, 547 (In. 2000) (citing
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d); People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1l. 1999)
(finding Public Act 88-680 to be invalid)). A legislative enactment violates the
single subject rule when the bill includes unrelated provisions that have no
legitimate relation to one another. Cervantes,723 N.E.2d at 267 The rule prevents
the legislature from grouping unpopular measures with popular ones so as to ensure
"that the legislature addresses the difficult decisions it faces directly and subject to
public scrutiny, rather than passing unpopular measures on the backs of popular
ones." Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (III. 1999).
In response to the Cervantes ruling, the Illinois General Assembly enacted
Public Act 91-696 to re-enact ceitan criminal provisions of Public Act 88-680,
including the amendments to section 150/5.1. The Act went into effect on April 13,
2000. See Pub. Act 91-696, art. 50, sec. 50-10, 2000 111. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-696
(West, WESTLAW through 2000 Legis. Sess.) ("This Act re-enacts certain
crmimal provisions of Public Act 88-680, including subsequent amendments, to
remove any question as to the validity or content of those provisions.").
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years of age but under 17 years of age and the accused was less than 5
years older than the victim."44 As defined by this section, sexual conduct
between teenage individuals who are between thirteen and sixteen years of
age falls within the definition ofcriminal sexual abuse. For example, iftwo
fifteen-year-old teenagers were involved m a sexual relationship, each teen
could be charged with having committed criminal sexual abuse upon the
other.415 In People v. Maness,4 the teenagers involved were thirteen and
seventeen years of age, respectively 47 Consequently, their sexual relationship was prohibited by section 5/12-15(c). Criminal sexual abuse is a Class
A misdemeanor," punishable by a maximum of 364 days in prison.49
In addition to the prohibition on permitting the sexual abuse of a child,
section 150/5.1 also required a parent, step-parent, legal guardian, or any

44720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000). The term "victim"

includes consensual partners, such as Lynlee. The statute defines the following
behaviors as criminal sexual abuse:
(a) The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if he or she:
(1) commits an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of
force; or
(2) commits an act of sexual conduct and the accused knew that the
victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to
give knowing consent
(b) The accused commits crimial sexual abuse if the accused was under 17
years of age and commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct
with a victim who was at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age
when the act was committed.
(c)The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act
of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13
years of age but under 17 years of age and the accused was less than 5 years
older than the victim.
Id.
45 See In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 635(II. App. Ct 1997) ("[W]here
two
miors engage m a consensual sexual act,

[section 5/12-15(b)] may validly be

applied to prosecute both mmors on the basis that each is the victim of the other.").
Although the court in T.W was discussing section 5/12-15(b), its reasoning is
equally applicable to the use of section 5/12-15(c). Two fifteen-year-olds involved
in a sexual relationship could be charged under both sections of the statute.
People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (111. 2000).
"Id. at 548. During the sexual relationship, the seventeen-year-old turned
eighteen. Id. The two dated for approximately four months before beginning the
sexual relationship, which lasted another five months. Id.
49 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(d) (West Supp. 2000).
41730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-3(1) (West 1997).
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other person with custody of a child to take "reasonable steps" to protect
that child from the felomes of criminal sexual assault, aggravated crunmal
sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal
sexual abuseCrnimmnal sexual assault mcludes acts of sexual penetration
50 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000). Crimmal sexual
assault is a Class 1 felony. Id. at 5/12-13(b). Aggravated crimnal sexual assault is
a Class X felony. Id. at 5/12-14(d). Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is
a Class X felony. Id. at 5/12-14.1(b). Aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a Class
2 felony. Id. at 5/12-16(g). A Class X felony carries a sentence of six to thirty
years, a Class 1 felony carries a sentence of four to fifteen years, and a Class 2
felony carries a sentence of three to seven years. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-81 (West Supp. 2000).
"In 1994, over 3 million children were reported for child abuse and neglect to
child protective service
agencies in the United States." National Committee to
Prevent Child Abuse, Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics from the National
Committee to Prevent Child Abuse (Apr. 1995), at http://www.vix.com/pub/
men/abuse/studies/child-ma.html. Eleven percent of these cases were for sexual
abuse. Id. Ina 1998 report to the Illinois General Assembly, the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services announced that 162,537 children were identified
m investigated reports of alleged abuse in 1997 ILL. DEP'T OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVS., A REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION OF THE PROTOCOL (May 1, 1998),

http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/cerap.html.
Considering the public concern about the number of children who are sexually
and physically abused, the Illinois General Assembly may seek to revitalize the
now-defunct section 150/5.1. Moreover, given the urgency expressed in the
Assembly's enactment of Public Act 91-696, broadening the scope of section
150/5.1 and raising the penalty for its violation from a Class A misdemeanor to a
Class 1 felony, legislators would likely clarify any ambiguities and rejuvenate the
statute. "The provisions
amending
the Wrongs to Children Act are of vital
concern to the people of this State and legislative action concerning those
provisions
is necessary." Pub. Act 91-696, art. 50, see. 50-10,2000 Ml. Legis.
Serv. PA. 91-696 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Legis. Sess.).
On May 4, 2000, Illinois Governor George H. Ryan created the Illinois
Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission. Exec. Order No. 2000-9, 24 Ill.
Reg. 7755, 2000 WL 725928. The Commission's charge is to "[c]onduct a
comprehensive study and analysisof the existing criminal laws" of Illinois and
propose clear and simple language to clarify its wording and structure. Id. The
Commission will review the criminal code to ensure that the laws are fair to both
defendants and victims and will propose new provisions to account for the influx
of technology in the modem world. See id.
Should the Commission and General Assembly decide to revise the statute, care
should be taken to avoid treading on constitutional concerns beyond vagueness.
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accompanied by the use of force or threat of force and situations m which
the accused was a family member or a person who occupied a position of
trust or authority with respect to the victim.5 ' Aggravating circumstances
that would elevate a charge of criminal sexual assault to aggravated
criminal sexual assault include the use of a dangerous weapon during the
commission of the offense or the causing of bodily harm to the victim.52
Rewriting the statute to cure vagueness defects will not guarantee a stamp of
constitutional purity. The statute may remain vulnerable to attack under the federal
and Illinois constitutions for violating parental rights to privacy in family matters.
See infra Part V
51 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13 (West Supp. 2000). Section 5/12-13(a)
provides:
The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:
(1)commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of
force; or
(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the
victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to
give knowing consent; or
(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under
18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a
family member, or
(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least
13 years of age but under 18 years of age when the act was committed
and the accused was 17 years of age or over and held a position of trust,
authority or supervision m relation to the victim.
Id.
Id. at 5/12-14. Section 5/12-14 provides:
(a) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she
commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating
circumstances existed during, or for the purposes of paragraph (7) of ths
subsection (a) as part of the same course of conduct as, the commission of
the offense:
(1) the accused displayed, threatened to use, or used a dangerous
weapon, other than a firearm, or any object fashioned or utilized m such
a manner as to lead the victim under the circumstances reasonably to
believe it to be a dangerous weapon; or
(2) the accused caused bodily harm, except as provided in subsection
(a)(10), to the victim; or
(3) the accused acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the
life of the victim or any other person; or
(4) the criminal sexual assault was perpetrated during the course of the
commission or attempted commission of any other felony by the
accused; or

2000-2001]

A LTTLE PRIVACY, PLEASE

Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child involves acts of sexual
penetration between an accused over seventeen years of age and a victim
under thirteen years of age.' Aggravated criminal sexual abuse covers a

(5) the victim was 60 years of age or over when the offense was
committed; or
(6) the victim was a physically handicapped person; or
(7) the accused delivered (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of
possession, or any other means) to the victim without hIs or her consent,
or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any
controlled substance; or
(8) the accused was armed with a firearm; or
(9) the accused personally discharged a firearm during the commission
of the offense; or
(10) the accused, during the commission of the offense, personally
discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm,
permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another
person.
(b) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if the accused
was under 17 years of age and (i) commits an act of sexual penetration with
a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act was committed; or (ii)
commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least 9 years
of age but under 13 years of age when the act was committed and the
accused used force or threat of force to commit the act.
(c) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she
commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was an
institutionalized severely orprofoundly mentally retardedperson at the time
the act was committed.
Id.

53 720 ILL. COMP.

STAT. ANN. 5/12-14.1 (West Supp. 2000). Section 5/12-14.1
provides:
(a) The accused commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if:
(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of
sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when
the act was committed; or
(1.1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and, while armed with a
firearm, commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was
under 13 years of age when the act was committed; or
(1.2) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of
sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when
the act was committed and, during the commission of the offense, the
accused personally discharged a firearm; or
(2) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of
sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when
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broad spectrum of behavior, including an act of criunal sexual abuse
accompanied by an aggravating factor such as the use of a dangerous
weapon or causing physical harm to the victimm The statute defining

the act was committed-and the accused caused great bodily harm to the
victim that:
(A) resulted in permanent disability; or
(B) was life threatenmg; or
(3) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of
sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when
the act was committed and the accused delivered (by mjection,
inhalation, ingestion, transfer ofpossession, or any other means) to the
victim without his or her consent, or by threat or deception, and for
other than medical purposes, any controlled substance.
Id.
54 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-16 (West Supp. 2000). Section 5/12-16
provides:
(a) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she
commits criminal sexual abuse as defined in subsection (a) of Section 12-15
of this Code and any of the following aggravating circumstances existed
during, or for the purposes of paragraph (7) of this subsection (a) as part of
the same course of conduct as, the commission of the offense:
(1)the accused displayed, threatened to use or used a dangerous weapon
or any object fashioned or utilized m such a manner as to lead the victim
under the circumstances reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous
weapon; or
(2) the accused caused bodily harm to the victim; or
(3) the victim was 60 years of age or over when the offense was
committed; or
(4) the victim was a physically handicapped person; or
(5) the accused acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the
life of the victim or any other person; or
(6) the criminal sexual abuse was perpetrated during the course of the
commission or attempted commission of any other felony by the
accused; or
(7) the accused delivered (by mjection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of
possession, or any other means) to the victim without his or her consent,
or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any
controlled substance.
(b) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she
commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was under 18 years of
age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member.
(c) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if:
(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and (i) commits an act of
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aggravated criminal sexual abuse also prohibits sexual conduct between an
accused who is at least seventeen years of age and a victim under thirteen
years of age and between a victim who is at least thirteen years of age and
55
an accused who is at least five years older than the victim.

IH. PurrTiNG SECrION 150/5.1 IN CONTEXT:
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
A. The ParentalLiability Trend
Pumshing the parents ofjuvenile delinquents is not a concept novel to
state criminal justice systems.5 6 Colorado enacted the first law holding
sexual conduct with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the
act was committed; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a
victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age when
the act was committed and the accused used force or threat of force to
commit the act; or
(2) the accused was under 17 years of age and (i) commits an act of
sexual conduct with a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act
was committed; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim
who was at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age when the act
was committed and the accused used force or threat of force to commit
the act.
(d) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she
commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who
was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the accused was
at least 5 years older than the victim.
(e) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she
commits an act of sexual conduct with avictim who was an institutionalized
severely or profoundly mentally retarded person at the time the act was
committed.
(f) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she
commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years
of age but under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the
accused was 17 years of age or over and held a position of trust, authority
or supervision in relation to the victim.
Id.
5s Id.

56 Although

the imposition ofvicanous liability "is contrary to the basic AngloAmerican premise ofcrunmaljustice that crime requires personal fault on the part
of the accused," WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMiNAL LAW § 3.9, at 271 (3d ed. 2000),
at least seventeen states have enacted legislation imposing vicarious criminal
liability upon parents for the conduct of their children. Id. at 267 n.10.
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parents cnm ally liable for their mmor children's wrongful acts m 1903.
It has been suggested that the dramatic increase in juvenile delinquency
during the 1950s and 1960s caused more and more states to enact parental
liability laws in an attempt to curb this juvenile criminal behavior. 8 The
rationale behind the laws is that parents are m the best position to prepare
children to become productive members of society 11 Accordingly, parents
should instill into their children inportant societal values, includingrespect
for authority and the law. ° Parental liability advocates argue that madequate parental control and guidance cause juvenile delinquency 61 Thus,
nposing fines or prison terms for poor parenting compels wayward
Parental liability for the acts of minor children has also taken the form of
vicarious tort liability. Early common law did not allow parents to be vicariously
liable for the torts of their children. W PAGE KEETON ET"AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 913 (5th ed. 1984). The judgment-proof
status of most children, however, left many tort victims without recourse. See id.
To compensate these victims, virtually every state adopted parental liability laws
imposing civil liability on parents for property damages and personal mjunes
caused by their children. See id. See also Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control? The
Uses andAbuses ofParentalLiabilityLaws to ControlJuvenileDelinquency in the
United States, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV 621, 629-38 (1997) (discussing parental

liability for the tortious acts of children).
' For a discussion of the Colorado law that made it a crime to contribute to the
delinquency of a minor see Irving A. Gladstone, The Legal Responsibility of
ParentsforJuvenileDelinquencyin New York State: A DevelopmentalHistory,21
BROOK. L. REV 172, 173-74 (1955).
58 "Pushmg

parents
is presumed to have a deterrent affect on
actions"
of parents that could "cause" or create a "tendency" for a child to become a
delinquent. Chapin, supranote 56, at 648. By 1961, forty-eight states had enacted
so-called "contributing statutes." James A. Kenny & James V Kenny, Shall We
Punish the Parents?,47 A.B.A. J. 804, 805 (1961). In the late 1960s, President
Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on Poverty" focused on the social causes of
delinquency. Acknowledging the role of parents m raising a child, Johnson's
programs also stressed the role of social factors-including poverty, living
environment, education, and employment opportunities-in producing the
problem of juvenile delinquency. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN

A FREE SOCIETY 55-89 (1967); DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR ON
POVERTY (1986).

9See infra Part V.A.2.
See SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL. THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO

60

FAMILY BREAKDOWN 12-13 (1971).

61 Jerry E. Tyler & Thomas W Segady, ParentalLiability Laws: Rationale,
Theory, andEffectiveness, 37 Soc. Scd. 1. 79, 84-91 (2000).
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parents to control their children, which would lead to a decrease m the
incidence ofjuvenile crime.62
The most common types of criminal parental liability legislation are
truancy and curfew laws' and "contributing" statutes.6 Truancy laws, or
compulsory school attendance laws, typically include provisions that hold
a parent or other custodian accountable for a child's failure to attend
school. These statutes are fueled by state power to regulate schools and
require children ofproper age to attend;6 5 they seek to assure regular school
attendance.
The standard curfew law controls the presence of juveniles in public
places at mghttime." In addition, most.curfew ordinances impose parental
responsibility for the child's compliance with the curfew 67 The purpose of
this added layer of liability is to encourage parental supervision ofchildren
so that fewer curfew violations will occur and so that minors are properly
protected.68
62

See

Id.

' Truancy and curfew laws are commonly referred to as "status offenses"
because the conduct underlying the charge would not be criminal if committed by
an adult ARNOLD BINDER ET AL., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: HISTORICAL,
CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTrVES 21-22 (2d ed. 1997).
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also Eumce A. Eichelberger,
Annotation, CrminalResponsibilityofParentforAct of Child, 12 A.L.R. 4th 673700 (1994).
"Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534 (1925) ("No question is raised
concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, thewr teachers and pupils; to require that all children
of proper age attend some school.
"). Although the Court struck down an
Oregon truancy statute requiring all children to attend public schools, where states
have provided for an alternative to public schooling, truancy laws have been
upheld. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937); State v. Williams,
228 N.W 470 (S.D. 1929).
"These statutes typically forbid designatedpersons, usually minors, from being
m certain places at night-such as public streets and public buildings-unless
accompaiedby aresponsible adult orpossessmg areasonable excuse for violating
the curfew. See, e.g., People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1945). At least one city has an ordinance that restricts the movement of children
during the day. Cathy Werblin, SealBeachDaytime Curfew.Approved, L.A. TIMES
(Orange County Edition), Oct. 1, 1996, at B5, 1996 WL 12741497
67 Few reported cases, however, address criminal parental liability for curfew
violations. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F Supp. 1046 (D. N.H.
1981), rev'don othergrounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982); Walton, 161 P.2d at
501, City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
68 Walton, 161 P.2d at 501 (stating that "legislation peculiarly applicable to
[minors] is necessary for ther proper protection"). Although courts have not
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Contributing statutes are found m virtually every jurisdiction in the
United States.69 Pursuant to these laws, adults, including parents and
custodians, are criminally liable for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor.7 0 Pumshmg parents and other adults is presumed to deter them from
adding to or encouraging juvenile delinquency, which is expected to
decline in frequency 71
In recent years, criminal parental liability laws have experienced a
revival of sorts, with legislatures expanding the scope of these statutes m
an attempt to deter juvenile crime, which has increased in size and violence
over the past decade.' Tins unsettling increase in juvenile crime and
violence prompted the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families
of the House of Representatives to hold a hearing in 1989 to determine the
causes ofthe violence and to recommend a solution to the problem.' Many
experts on juvenile delinquency testifying before the committee pointed to
family breakdown as a major contributor to juvenile crime7 and recomdirectly discussed the rationale for punishing the parents of curfew violators, the
reasoning for parental liability is implicit m opinions addressing the purpose of
curfew laws. See, e.g., id.
69 For a listing of many of these statutes, see Kathryn 1. Parsley, Note,
ConstitutionalLimitations on State Powerto Hold ParentsCriminally Liablefor
the DelinquentActs ofTheir Children,44 VAND. L. REV 441,447 n.41 (1991).
70Id. at 447 See, e.g., State v. Ritcle, No. 2000-CA-20, 2000 WL 1209276
(Ono Ct. App., Aug. 25, 2000) (affirming conviction for contributing to
delinquency of minor for providing marijuana to minor); State v. McVay, 612
N.W.2d 572 (S.D. 2000) (affirming conviction for contributing to delinquency of
minor for furnishing alcohol to minor); Bostic v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 67
(Va. Ct. App. 2000) (affirmmg conviction for contributing to delinquency ofminor
for providing cigarettes and liquor to minor).
71See State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 709, 710 (Ohio 1958) (prosecuting parents for
acting "in a way tending to cause [the] delinquency" of their daughter).
I See Press Release, Senator Dan Coats, Coats Says Federal Government
Incomplete on Juvenile Crime (July 15, 1996), LEXIS, FDCH Congressional Press
Releases. In 1994, the number of juvenile court cases increased by twenty-six
percent. Juvenile CrimeSoaring,JusticeDept. Says, S.F CHRON., July 15, 1994,
atA4, 1994 WL 4058669. Despite a two percent drop in the overall crime rate, the
arrest rate forjuveniles rose another eleven percent in 1994. Scott Glover, National
CnmeRateDrops,FBISays StatisticsShow Youth Offenses Stillon the Rise, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 19, 1995, at 3A, 1995 WL 11385989.
1 Down These Mean Streets: Violence By and Against America's Children:
HearingBefore the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 101 st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
4"I thnk to a large degree the deterioration of the family structure has played
a significantpart in [contributing to juvenile crime]." Id.at44 (statement ofReggie
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mended that parents be held accountable for the violent activities of their
children.75
This expansion in the scope of parental responsibility laws is evident
in some contributing statutes, which, in addition to general terms making
it a crime to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, also contain specific
language directing parental behavior. For example, contributing statutes in
New York and Kentucky require parents "to exercise reasonable diligence
in the control" of their children.76 In Oregon, parents may be charged with
"failing to supervise a child." 7 An act that has received much national
attention is Califorma's "gang-parent" liability statute, which was enacted
to control violent criminal street gang activity 78 The statute "enlist[s]
parents as active participants in the effort to eradicate
[street] gangs"7 9
by imposing on parents a duty to "exercise reasonable care, supervision,
protection, and control oftheir minor child[ren]."80 Various other jurisdictions have also enacted local parental responsibility ordinances that impose
criminal liability on parents for a variety ofjuvenile behavior. 1
B. Walton, Associate Judge, Superior Court ofthe District ofColumbia). "Violence
on the streets cannot be separated from what is happening in the home." Id. at 11
(statement of Representative Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.).
7 "[T]he first
step m reducing juvenile delinquency has to be to make negligent
parents, who are just kind of not exerting themselves in a proper way, exert some
control over their charges." Id. at 119 (statement of Karl Zinsmeister, Adjunct
Research Associate, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
"[I]f the parent directly participates m the child's conduct or in some way
encourages the commission of an act committed by a child, liability (civil or
criminal) would seem appropriate." Id. at 165 (statement of Reggie B. Walton,
Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia).
76 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
260.10(2) (McKinney 2000).
11 OR. REv. STAT. § 163.577(1) (1999). This duty is limited to supervising
children under the age of fifteen. Id.
7 8See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999). Those convicted under the statute
may be sentenced to up to one year m jail and a $2500 fine. Id.For commentary
on section 272, see Chapm, supranote 56, at 654-62. See also Sharon A. Ligorsky,
Note, Williams v. Garcetti: ConstitutionalDefectsin California's"Gang-Parent"
Liability Statute, 28 LoY. LA. L. REV 447 (1994); Toni Weinstein, Note, Visiting
the Shis of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of Crimznal ParentalLiability
Statutes,
64 S.CAL. L. REV 859 (1991).
79Williams
v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993) (discussing the purpose
underlying section 272).
80 CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999). A person is considered a minor in
California until he or she reaches the age of eighteen. Id.
" For instance, in January 1995, the rural community of Silverton, Oregon
passed an ordinance making it a crime for parents and legal guardians to fail to
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As applied to situations similar to that in Maness,' the Illinois statute
operated as a traditional parental responsibility law, blaming parents for
their offspring's juvenile delinquency 8 3 The delinquent acts triggering4
parental prosecution were the consensual sexual acts of their teens.
Accordingly, the law resembledtraditional parental responsibility laws that
commanded parents to control and supervise their children.85 Including

supervise a child under the age of seventeen. See Maya Blackmun, The Parent
Trap, OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 13, 1995, at Cl, 1995 WL 9181486; Parental
Responsibility Laws, OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 13, 1995, at C4, 1995 WL
9181373. Oregon's parental liability law, enacted m September of 1995, which
charges parents with the supervision of children under fifteen, was partly modeled
after this local law. See OR. REV STAT. § 163.577 (1999); Blackmun, supra.
People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (1. 2000).
83 Authorities could not have charged Lynlee for engaging in a sexual
relationship with Leonard because Leonard had reached the statutory age of
consent. The criminal sexual abuse statute, however, does not require the accused
to be older than the victim. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp.
2000) (requiring only that the accused be less than five years older than the victim).
Accordingly, if Leonard had been a year younger, both teens presumably could
have been charged with the criminal sexual abuse of the other. See id. Certainly,
if Lynlee and Leonard had been the same age (and under seventeen), they both
could have been charged under section 5/12-15(c), and thus Maness could have
been charged pursuant to section 150/5.1. See supranote 45 (citing In reT.W., 685

N.E.2d 631 (III. App. Ct. 1997)) (endorsingthe concept ofsame-age prosecutions).
Iromcally, even if Leonard's parents had been aware of their son's sexual
relationship with Lynlee, they could not have been charged under the statute. See
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000); id. at 150/5.1. If,
however, Leonard had been but a year younger and is parents had been cognizant
of the sexual nature ofthe relationship, Leonard's parents could have been charged
for violating section 150/5.1.
84 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000) (cnmmalizmg
sexual conduct including consensual adolescent sexual activity).
85 Admittedly, the Illinois statute differed from more traditional forms of
parental liability statutes because it appeared to impose liability on parents for
failing to protect their children from certain harms. In general, protecting one's
child from harm is a basic parental obligation. See, e.g., State v. Williquette, 385
N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (stretching the language of the state's child abuse statute
to apply to parent who knowingly permitted another person to abuse child). That
a child may be a willing participant m what the law deems a harm to that child does
not alter or affect this parental obligation. For example, a parent must seek medical
care for a seriously ill child even if the child does not wish to obtain medical care.
The distinction between the illinois statute and statutes that require parents to
protect and provide for their children is that teenagers engaging in consensual
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adolescent sexual conduct as a trigger for parental liability revealed the
legislature's perception ofthe responsibility ofparents to control the sexual
conduct of their children. Sexual activity with a minor or among minors
belowthe age of consent constituted delinquent behavior.8 6 By marking the
age of consent at seventeen,8 7 Illinois lawmakers identified a wide range of
adolescent sexual activity-as well as a large number of adolescent
perpetrators of tis activity-as criminal. The wide-ranging scope of
potential juvenile liability would have perforce translated into an equally
extensive span of potential parental liability had section 150/5.1 not been
ruled unconstitutional. 8
B. The ConstitutionalQuandaries
Criminal parental responsibility laws deviate from the deference
legislatures and courts have traditionally given to the family and encroach
upon constitutionally recognized parental authority to make childrearing
decisions. 9 The courts have consistently held that the primary responsibil-

sexual activities are volitional actors who perceive the risks of their conduct in
much the same way as adults would, unlike a child who refuses to see the doctor.
Trying to prevent a teenager from having sex is less like trying to protect a child
from a hazard and more like trying to prevent a teenager from stealing.
Accordingly, in Maness, the linois statute functioned as a parental liability law,
commanding
parents to control and supervise their children.
86
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000).

87 1d. at 5/12-15(b)-(c)

(defining a crimial sexual abuse victim as a person at
least nine years of age but under seventeen years of age if the accused was under
seventeen years of age, or a person at least thirteen years of age but under
seventeen years of age if the accused is less than five years older than the victim).
8 Relevant to this Article is parental liability for the sexual relationships of
teens between the ages of thirteen and sixteen and their adolescent partners
between the ages ofthirteen and twenty. See infra note 224 (listing the age pairings
punishable under section 5/12-15(c)).
89 See infra Part VA. These statutes have also been attacked on grounds of
vagueness, overinclusiveness, violation of due process rights, violation ofcrimnal
principles regarding omissions and causation, and contravention of the Eighth
Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. For commentary on
these issues, see S.Randall Humm, Comment, CrminalizingPoorParentingSkills
asa Means to Contain ViolenceBy andAganstChildren, 139 U. PA. L.REV 1123,
1138-42, 1145-51 (1991) (discussing vagueness, overinclusiveness, criminal

onussions and causation); Ligorsky, -supra note 78, at 452-68 (discussing
vagueness and overbreadth); Parsley, supra note 69, at 448-71 (discussing
vagueness and due process); Wemstem, supra note 78, at 885-91, 894-900
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ity for childcare belongs to parents." With the exceptions of abuse or
severe neglect, 91 courts have been unwilling .to scrutinize particular
parenting styles.92 By contrast, parental liability laws seek to penalize
parents when outside authorities deem their manner of supervision to be
deficient. 9 These laws represent a shift in the delicate balance between
state interest m protecting children and family privacy Implicit in these
laws is a legislative rejection of the judicial policy favoring parental
discretion and an assumption that the state is better suited than parents to
define appropriate responses to juvenile behavior. These laws also differ
from most regulations affecting family relationslps in that they
assign crimnal liability to parents who fail to meet governmental expectations. 4
Criminal parental liability statutes are constitutionally troublesome
because the efficacy'of these statutes m preventing the delinquent acts of
children is questionable.9 5 The only recognized study of the effect of these
laws was conducted by Judge Paul W. Alexander, ajuvenile court judge m
Toledo, Ohio.96 Judge Alexander analyzedthe effect ofToledo's contributing ordinance on juvenile delinquency and concluded that pumshing
(discussing Eighth Amendment and vagueness).
9o
See generally infra Part V.A.
91 See, e.g., infra
note 197
9 See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
93 Professor
Erwin Chemernsky, of the University of Southern Californa Law
School, considers parental responsibility laws to be "frightening" because they
allow the state to "inquire into parenting through criminal liability." Scott
Armstrong, Antigang Law Targets Parents,CHRISTIAN SC. MONiTOR, May 9,
1989, at 8.
' The reluctance of states to employ criminal statutes m the family context is
a consequence of the deference shown to family autonomy. See nfra Part V.A.2.
9 See Chapm, supra note 56, at 632-38.
See Judge Paul W Alexander, What's This About PunishingParents?,FED.
PROBATION, Mar. 1948, at 23. Judge Alexander's research, however, did not
incorporate accepted social science methodology. See Chapin, supra note 56, at
654 n.184 (explaining that Judge Alexander's study was based on an informal
review of the decisions m his court).
Evidence indicates that civil parental liability statutes also fail to deter juvenile
crime. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1963 examined the
crime rates of sixteen states that had enacted civil parental liability statutes. Alice
B. Freer, ParentalLiabilityforTorts ofChildren, 53 KY. L.J. 254, 264-65 (1964)
(citing the Department's study). The study revealed that the rate of juvenile
delinquency m those states was slightly ugher than the national average during
1957-1962. See id.
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parents did not deter juvenile criminal behavior.9 7 Even more disturbing,
he discovered that application ofthe statute did not encourage other parents
to improve their parenting skills. 8 Although empirical research suggests
that juvenile delinquency may be related to poor parental supervision, the
findings are neither conclusive nor consistent. 99 Other contributors to
juvenile crime include drug abuse, school failure, antisocial values,
educational level, living conditions, and peer groups. 00
Despite its modem trappings, the Illinois statute shares the same
defects inherent in the other parental responsibility laws. Juvenile
delinquency-and, in particular, adolescent sexual activity-results from
more than just bad parenting.'0 ' While inadequate or irresponsible
parenting may be one cause of delinquency, other factors also contribute
to juvenile sexual behavior, including the growth of dual-mcome families,
thus increasing the number of latch-key children, and the influence of
community and public institutions such as schools."° Peer pressure and the
absence of other adults mthe community to monitor children when they are
away from
1 3 their parents also impact a teen's decision to mitiate sexual
0

activity.

Even if teenage sexual activity were a direct result of bad parenting,
laws that punish parents are not guarantors of better parenting. Like the
causes of adolescent sexual activity, the causes of inadequate parenting are
multiple and complex-chrome stress, financial considerations, and

I Alexander, supranote 96, at 28 (finding "no evidence that punishung parents
has any effect whatsoever upon the curbing of juvenile delinquency").
9 See id.
9 For information about current empmcal studies on the role of parents m
juvenile delinquency, see Chapin, supranote 56, at 669-71. Chapm discusses three
studies that test the relationship between parenting and juvenile criminal activity
Id.
100 See Youth and the Justice System: Can We Intervene Earlier?"Heanng
Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families,98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 92-93 (1984) (statement of James Austin, Director of Research, National
Council on Crime and Delinquency) (reiterating expert findings linking juvenile
delinquency to combinations of predictive factors and stating that association with
delinquent peers is, perhaps, the greatest contributor); Thomas A. Nazano, What
Do We Know About Delinquency?, UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED EDUC. at 8-9
(Spring 1988) (stating that experts cannot agree on a single cause of juvenile
delinquency).
o1 See generally supra note 100 and accompanying text.
,02
See infra Part V.B.2.b.
103 See infra Part V.B.2.b.
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physical or mental disability among family members are just a few of the
many factors underlying lax parenting."M
IV SECTION 150/5.1:

A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE PARENTAL LIABILITY TREND
Despite being ruledunconstitutionalon vagueness grounds, the Illinois
criminal parental responsibility statute"05 signifies an alarming expansion
ofthe parental liabilitytrend. The statute departed from traditional parental
responsibility laws with respect to the particular juvenile acts the state
sought to deter. States typically employ criminal parental liability laws to
discourage deviant juvenile acts, such as juvenile violence or curfew
violations, winch society generally views as instances of delinquent
conduct. 10 6 The American public as a whole, however, does not perceive
consensual sexual activity between teenage contemporaries as deviant
conduct.1 7 Accordingly, the purpose of the Illinois law diverged significantly from that of traditional parental liability laws: Illinois sought to use
section 150/5.1 to shape societal norms and alter the sexual behavior of its
youth.
Tis new development in the ongoing parental liability trend is
especially distressing because of its aggressive intrusion into the sanctity
of family life. While states have been willing to impose criminal liability
on parents who fail to protect their children from egregious acts such as
severe neglect or abuse, ' neverbefore have states attemptedto inspect and
evaluate ordinary parental supervision. 9 The use ofparental liability laws
to define the role of parents in helping young people prepare for mature
sexual relationships exposes the relationship between parent and
child-one of the most private and personal of human relationships-to
scrutiny by the criminal justice system.110
The most disconcerting aspect of the Illinois law is its enormous
potential to usher m a host of state laws or municipal ordinances granting
broad authority to police and prosecutors to intervene m the affairs of the

...See Harnett Wilson, Parental Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of
Delinquency,20 BRiT. . CRIMINOLOGY 203, 233-34 (1980); infra Part V.3.2.b.i.
15 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).

'0 6 See supra Part II.A.
1

o, See supra note 3; znfra notes 119-26, Part V.B.2.a.
197
1o9 See infra Part V.A.2.
"0 See infraPart V.B.1.
1os See infra note
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family."' The American public is very interested m the voluminous amount
ofresearchtracking adolescent sexual activity; 2 the statistics generatedby
these studies have refocused the media spotlight on.the role of parents in
juvenile sexual behavior."3 Public concern and confusion about the
apparent epidemic of teenage sex could therefore motivate other states to
draft their own versions of the Illinois parental responsibility law, wich
4
would exact a heavy toll on parental rights nationally "
Illinois's attempt to use the criminal justice system to reduce adolescent sexual behavior reveals a larger societal problem: our inability to cope
with the phenomenon of teenage sexuality. In a society that is constantly
5
pushing the envelope, sexual experimentation begins at a younger age."
The emergent portrait of youthful promiscuity and sexually savvy
youngsters has left many parents feeling baffled and alarmed." 6 Most
parents who are aware ofthis teen "sexual revolution" are torn between two
seemingly contradictory choices-preaching abstinence or proposing
prophylactics:
In one breath, parents say they perceive it as a public-health issue and
want more information about sexualbehavior and its consequences, easier
access to contraceptives and more material in the media about responsible
human and sexual interaction. And m the next breath, they claim it's a
moral issue to be resolved through preaching abstinence and the virtues
of virginity and getting the trash off TV 1"
Part of the problem for many adults is that they are unsure about how
they feel about teen sex."8 Sexual conduct among teen contemporaries is
a sensitive issue with adults." 9 A study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute

See infra Part V.B .1.
See, e.g., supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
113See, e.g., supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.1.
"5 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
6See Stodghill, supra note 4.
17 Id. at 58.
1 See id.
"9In many ways, the issue of teen sex is analogous to the issue of consumption
of alcohol by minor children. Although all states have laws restricting the
possession and consumption of alcohol by minors, many states allow minors to
possess or consume alcohol with theirparents' permission. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 04.16.051 (Michie 1998) (providing that parents can provide alcohol to their
children); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23224 (West Supp. 2000) (providing that aminor can
"'
1

"14
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reveals that one-third of adults believe that adolescent sexual activity is
wrong.12 A majority of adults, however, are not opposed to it and think
that, under certain conditions, adolescent sexual conduct is normal, healthy
21
behavior.1

possess alcohol with a parent m a car); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-122 (West
1999) (providing that a minor can consume alcohol on private property with the
consent of the owner and the consent of a parent who is present); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 30-89 (West 1990) (providing that a minor can possess alcohol m a
parent's presence); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23 (Supp. 2000) (providing that a minor
can consume alcohol in a parent's home if a parent is present); HAW. REV STAT.
§712-1250.5 (1993) (providing that a defendant may raise an affirmative defense
to providing liquor to a minor if the minor's parent gave express consent and the
provider had a reasonable belief that alcohol would be consumed in the parent's
home); 235 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/6-20 (West Supp. 2000) (providing that a
minor may consume alcohol under the direct supervision and with the approval of
a parent in the privacy of the parental home); KAN. STAT. ANN. §41-727 (Supp.
1999) (providing that a minor can consume cereal malt beverage when permitted
and supervised by parent); LA. REV STAT. ANN. § 14:93.13 (West Supp. 2000)
(providing that a parent can buy alcohol for a minor); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138,
§ 34 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000) (providing that a parent can purchase alcohol for
a minor child); MONT. CODEANN. § 16-6-305 (1999) (providing that a parent can
provide alcohol in non-intoxicating quantity to a minor child); NEV REV STAT.
202.020 (2000) (providing that a minor can possess alcohol in presence of a
parent); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §265:8 1-a(1993) (providing that a minor can have
alcohol in a car if parents are present); N.Y. ALCO. BEv CONT. LAW § 65-C
(McKinney 2000) (providing that a minor can possess alcohol with intent to
consume if provided by a parent); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-08 (Supp. 1999)
(providing that a minor may drink alcohol in a restaurant if parents are present);
OHIO REV. CODEANN. §4301.631 (Anderson Supp. 1999) (providing that aminor
may consume low-alcohol beverages if accompaied by parent); OR. REV STAT.
§ 471.430 (1999) (providing that a minor may possess alcohol in a private
residence with parent's presence and consent); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-9 (1998)
(providing that a minox can have alcohol in a car if parents are present); S.D.
CODIFIEDLAWS §35-9-1.1 (Miclue 1999) (providing that aminorbetween the ages
of eighteen and twenty may purchase alcohol in the presence of a parent); TEX.
ALCO. BEV CODE ANN. § 106.05 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (providing that a minor
may possess alcohol in the presence of a parent); WASH. REV CODE § 66.44.270
(1998) (a parent may give alcohol to a minor child if it is consumed m the parent's
presence).
"0 See Stodghill, supranote 4, at 58.
12 See id. This uncertainty extends to situations in which an adolescent and his
or her sexual partner are not contemporaries. The law condemning consensual
intercourse between adults and minors illustrates our confusion. The legal
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Society's uncertainty with respect to the issue of teenage sexual
activity is also apparent in court decisions. The words of a California
Appeals Court are illustrative ofthis ambivalence. The court was reviewing
a civil case involving a sixteen-year-old girl who had been impregnated by
her boyfriend, also a minor." The girl's parents brought the suit against
the parents of the girl's boyfriend, charging them with the "willful
misconduct" of their son.1u3 Denying the claim that the boy's parents were
responsible for Ins conduct, 124 the court stated that it was "not inclined to
dwell on outdated legal fictions concerning the ability of underage females
to consent to sex."" s The court further stated: "The fact ofthe matter is that
m the latter part of the Twentieth Century, a substantial percentage of
minors of both sexes are engaging in sexual activity
To cling to
vestiges of a bygone era is to ignore the contemporary realities of

nature.'

26

The varying speeds at which adolescents move across the continuum
between childhood and adulthood compound the uncertainty about the
propriety of teenage sexual activity The differing ages of consent from
state to state are evidence of this lack of consensus over the point at which
a sexual relationship becomes harmful to one or both teens and the relative
arbitranness of any number. For example, in Hawaii the age of consent is
fourteen. 27 Other states, however, have set it as high as eighteen years of
age. 128
Moreover, the infusion of subjective standards of morality and
sexuality into the criminal law could provide lawmakers with a tool to
impose sweeping changes to societal norms and to reform the sexual
behavior of all Americans, not just teens. For example, a state or local
government might seek to adopt the role of bedfellow to its citizenry by

definition of rape has covered this type ofsexual abuse since the sixteenth century.
See 18 Eliz. c. 7, § 4 (1576). Today, most states continue to classify it as a form of
rape. "Yet in common parlance, we hedge, calling the offense 'statutory rape.' This
everyday expression is a term of ordinary language, not of law. The term 'statutory
rape' is not found in the penal codes themselves, and technically it has no legal
meaning." STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 101-02 (1998) (footnote omitted).
'2

Cyntla M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

123

Id.

12 Id. at98.
121 Id. at 98 n. 14.
1 6Id.
,27 HAW.

REV STAT. § 707-730(1)(b) (1993).
.See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West Supp. 2000).
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enacting laws consistent with the federal welfare reform law that funds
abstinence-only education efforts forAmencan schoolchildren. In addition
to discouraging teen sex, the federal statute contains elements broad
enough to encompass the sexual activities of much ofthe American public.
For instance, the law also disapproves of sexual activity for all unwed
persons and firmly establishes that"the expected standard ofhuman sexual
activity" is found m the "context of marriage." 9 Furthermore, the law
requires that state abstinence programs teach "the nportance of attaining
self-sufficiency before engaging in sexual activity"1 30 This implies that
people should refrain from entering into sexual relationslhps ifthey do not
have enough money to support themselves and any offspring. Another
concern is the type of conduct that the welfare reform statute targets. The
law supports abstinence from "sexual activity," but does not provide a
definition for this term.' Taken to an extreme, the law could be used to
2
discourage a variety of sexual behavior, including kissing.1
42 U.S.CA. § 710(b)(2)(D) (West Supp. 2000) ("[A] mutually faithful
monogamous relationship in [the] context of mamage is the expected standard of
human sexual activity."); see id. § 710(b)(2)(E) ("[S]exual activity outside of the
context of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical
effects[.]").
130 d. § 710(b)(2)(H).
"' See id. § 710(b)(2).
112 An existing example of state regulation of adult sexual activity is Louisiana's
sodomy statute. See LA. REv STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986). The law
crimmalizes certain private homosexual and heterosexual acts, including sexual
conduct among mramed couples. Despite several challenges to the law, the
Louisiana Supreme Court continues to hold the statute constitutional. See State v.
Baxley, 633 So. 2d 142 (La. 1994); State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374 (La. 1987); State
v. Woljar, 477 So. 2d 80 (La. 1985); State v. Lindsey, 310 So. 2d 89 (La. 1975).
The statute defines sodomy, or crimes against nature, as:
(1) The unnatural camal copulation by a human being with another of
the same sex or opposite sex or with an animal, except that anal sexual
intercourse between two human beings shall not be deemed as a crime
against nature when done under any of the circumstances described m
R.S. [§] 14:41 [rape defined], [§] 14:42 [aggravated rape], [§] 14:42:1
[forcible rape] or [§] 14:43 [simple rape]. Emission is not necessary; and,
when committed by a human being with another, the use of the genital
organ of one of the offenders of whatever sex is sufficient to constitute the
crime.
(2) The solicitation by a human being of another with the intent to engage
m any unnatural carnal copulation for compensation.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A) (West 1986).
12
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Public concern and anger about what might be considered the moral
deterioration of modem society might lead to more laws and ordinances
establishing standards for human sexual activity 31 3 A one-size-fits-all
conception of morality and sexuality could enable state governments to
climb into bed with the populace. Accordingly, lawmakers must carefully
weigh the Illinois prototype against constitutional assurances of privacy to
prevent further erosion of the bar to state intrusion into the family home.
V

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN FAMILY MATTERS

Intertwining abstinence-only initiatives with parental liability laws
provides a new twist on an old trend; the combination presents a new and
serious threat to privacy rights. Although in Maness'3 the Illinois Supreme
Court overturned section 150/5.1135 on the ground ofvagueness, the privacy
136
ramifications of the statute are, without a doubt, far more troubling.
Considering the possibility that other states will utilize the Illinois statute
as a blueprint for similar parental liability legislation, section 150/5.1
retains its potential to seriously undermine parental privacy rights. As
explained in the following sections, legislative attempts to require parents
to prevent their teens from having sex may chromcally run afoul of the
fundamental right of parents to raise their children.
A. Substantive Due ProcessMethodology
State and federal governments cannot deprive citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 137 The Due Process

" The poem "The Second Coming" by William Butler Yeats is often quoted
to depict the "immoral delinquency" of modem society. In particular, the third line
of the poem illustrates this concern: "Thmgs fall apart; the centre cannot hold."
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B.

YEATS 215 (Macmillan 1935).
"

People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (111. 2000).

1 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1

(West Supp. 2000).

Much can be done to tighten the imprecision of section 150/5.1; the
legislature can make clear what the "reasonable steps" are that a parent must take
to comply with the statute. For example, the Illinois General Assembly could direct
parents to notify the police or a state agency of conduct prohibited by the
enumerated acts in the statute. Legislators can also provide explicit guidelines to
be used by authorities in applying the law. Further, the legislative record can be
drafted so as to unmistakably convey the purpose of the law.
137 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. See Roe v Wade, 410 U.S.
113,152-56 (1973); Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-86 (1965); Meyer
136
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Clause' affords citizens both procedural' 39 and substantive' 4° protections
from governmental interference. Under substantive due process doctrine,
a statute is unconstitutional if it inperrmssibly restricts a person's life,
liberty, or property interest.1 4' In most cases, a court will uphold a statute
challenged under the Due Process Clause if it has a rational basis 42 and if
it is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective.1 43 If the statute
minpmges on a life, liberty, or property interest that is a fundamental right,
however, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny review.144 To survive such
review, the governmental interest must be compelling and the statute must

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399-403 (1923). Ourmodernnotions of substantive due
process are founded upon Justice Stephen J. Field's dissent m the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83-111 (1873). Justice Field looked beyond the spare language
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and saw inalienable
individual liberties:
Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue a lawful
employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally
affects all persons.
This equality of right, with exemption from all
disparaging and partial enactments, mthe lawful pursuits of life, throughout
the whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United
States.
Id.at 97, 109-10 (Field, J., dissenting). Field's concern was the protection of freelabor ideology, but substantive due process took on a life of its own. See id. at 83
(Field, J., dissenting). Beginning in the 1960s, a new class of substantive due
process suits made its way onto the Supreme Court's docket. These suits raised
"social" substantive due process issues pertaining to the freedom ofpersonal choice
andprivacy. See, e.g.,Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-56 (addressingthe legality ofabortion);
Griswold,381 U.S. at 485-86 (addressing the right to contraception).
.38U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"9 See Stanley v. llinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (granting unwed,
biological fathers the right to a hearing before state agencies could remove their
children on charges of parental unfitness).
40 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (reaffirming the
liberty interest of parents to raise and educate their children without undue
government interference); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(upholding the right of a parent to direct his or her child's education).
41 See, e.g., Kelley v Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (addressing a due
process challenge to a county regulation).
141 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
43
See id. at 488.
'" See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONALLAW:PRINCIPLESANDPOLICIES § 10.1.2,
at 640 (1997).
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be narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling interest. 145 In a due process
challenge involving a fundamental right, the government must prove that
less burdensome alternatives to its chosen method would not achieve its
objective. 146 Fundamental rights are those rights that are "implicit in the
concept oforderedliberty,"' 4 7 or"deeplyrooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. 148
1. The Expansive Conception ofFamily Privacy
The United States Supreme Court "has long recognized that freedom
of personal choice in matters of
family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 149 In

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
See id., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, § 10.1.2, at 643.
47
' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
148 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opimon). The definition of "fundamental nght" has been a subject of
much dispute. The Court consistently has looked beyond the text of the
Constitution to determine which fundamental rights the Due Process Clause
protects. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 165-66 (discussing childbearing); Loving
v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (discussing marrage). Recently, the Court has
stated that the Due Process Clause protects only those interests traditionally
protected by society. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (Scalia,
J., plurality opinion) ("In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due
Process] Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a
'liberty' be 'fundamental' . but also that itbe an interest traditionally protected
by our society."). The tradition rationale did not always prevail m older cases. See,
e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66 (recognizing the right to have an abortion despite
traditional restrictions on obtaining abortions). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 192-95 (1986) (finding that society traditionally has not protected the
right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J.,
plurality opimon) ("[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (grounding
protection of contraception privacy m marriage on traditional respect for marital
privacy and the status of mamage m American society). The parental right to
raising children is entrenched m tradition. See mnfra note 158.
"I Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); see
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (noting the "historic
respect. [and] sanctity traditionally accorded to [family] relationships"). For
most of its history, the Supreme Court has steered clear of the American family,
leaving the prinary responsibility for family laws with the states. Perhaps an
141
146
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Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court recognized the right of citizens to conduct
their own lives when it invalidated a Nebraska law that prohibited the
teaching of modem languages other than English to children who had not
passed the eighth grade. 51 Maintaining that the statute violated the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court described that liberty as an individual's right "to marry, establish a
home and bring up children,
and generally to enjoy privileges
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'' In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the Court struck down an Oregon initiative requiring
nearly every parent to send a child between the ages of eight and sixteen to
public schools. Citing Meyer, the Court held that the initiative unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the education and
153
upbringing of their children.

explanation for the Court's previous cautionary stance toward tacding family
issues is found in the following statement by Justice Potter Stewart: "Issues
involving the family
are among the most difficult that courts have to face,
involving as they often do serious problems of policy disguised as questions of
constitutional law." Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 624-25 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (judging the legality ofa state law empowering parents to commit their
children to mental institutions).
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the Court shed its earlier
reluctance and began to assume a greater supervisory role. See, e.g., Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing the private realm of family
life protected from state intervention absent substantial justification); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding the parental right to direct a
child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (upholding
the parental right to direct a child's education). Significant transformations in
American family life likely convinced the Court to become more active in
constructing family law rules. For example, the Court likely considered the
dramatic increase in divorce, the growing numbers of women entering the
workforce, the increased availability of contraception and abortion, the greater
involvement of government in family life via programs like Social Security and
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and alternative family arrangements that
challenged the existing definition of families. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 275 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
50
SeeMeyer, 262 U.S. at 397-403. Meyertaught in aparoclual school and used
a German bible history as a text for reading. Id. at 397
s''Id. at 399.
152 Pierce,268 U.S. at 530.
5id.at 534-35 ("[W] e think it entirelyplam that the
[statute] unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
of
children under their control."); see Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (holding invalid a state
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The emphasis mMeyer andPierceon fundamental rights not expressly
articulated in the Constitution and on family autonomy gave birth to a line
of privacy decisions's protecting various liberty interests pertaining to
matters of family life, including childrearng, 155 abortion rights, 56 and
access to contraceptives.' These rulings on family matters have greatly
expanded the legal conception of family privacy
2. The FundamentalNature ofParentalRights
The parental right to make childreanng decisions is included within the
concept of family privacy and is an essential and basic civil right.5 8 The
Court has "consistently recognized that
parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic m the

law that prohibited the instruction offoreign languages to children as "interfer[ing]
with. the power ofparents to control the education oftheir own"). The Court did
not, however, determine that all compulsory education laws violated the liberty
right of parents to direct the education of their children. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at
534-35. Instead, the "Pierce compromise" recognizes that the state may compel
school attendance, but that parents have the right to choose to send their children
to private or public schools. See id.
11 The right of privacy is "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
155See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968) (finding valid the state
interest in enacting laws to aid parents in discharging their responsibility for the
well-being of children).
'56 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). The Court remarked:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undemablywarrants deference and, absent apowerful countervailing
interest, protection. .The right[ ] to raise one's child[ ] [has] been
deemed "essential" [and one of the] "basic civil rights of man"
The
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 651 (citations omitted). The right of parents to make childreanng decisions
is rooted in tradition. See Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("The statist
notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority
is
repugnant to Americantradition.");Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02 (finding thatPlato's
ideas of normalizing the upbringing of children touch the "relation between
individual and state" in a manner "wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest").
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structure of our society"; 5 9 families occupy a private realm of society that
the state cannot enter without substantial justification. 160 A parent's
fundamental liberty interest m raising ns or her child deserves deference
unless the state can show a compelling countervailing interest. 61 One
commentator has argued that:
[T]he right to marry and the right to decide whether or not to have
children would have much less value if parents had no right to direct the
rearing of their children. The parents' interest stems from the importance
that raising a child may have m a full and rewarding life. Imparting values
and beliefs to one's children, responding to their constantly changing
demands, ensuring that they will realize their full potential as they grow
into adulthood-these are some of the opportunities that make the right
to control a child's upbringing so significant.1 62

159 Ginsberg

v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); see Quillom v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (stating that the Court has "recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected") (citations omitted);see also W. NORToNGRUBB &MARVINLAZERSON,

BROKEN PROMISES 45-47 (Umv. of Chicago Press 1988) (1982) (discussing the
decline of public responsibility and the ensuing enlargement of private
responsibility for children over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries); LYNN D. WARDLE ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW §§ 1.08-1.09
(1988) (discussing the courts' recognition of family autonomy and the right of
parents to raise their children without state interference).
'"Pnncev. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944)(recognizing "the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter"). Although the Court in Prince
found in favor of the state and upheld the conviction of a guardian who had
allowed her wards to sell religious leaflets in violation of child labor laws, it made
clear that there exists a realm of family life into which the state cannot venture
absent substantial justification. Id. at 166-71. The Court affitmed the conviction
based on the state's independent interest in the welfare of children within its
borders. Id. at 168-69. Though upholding the statute, the Court cautioned that its
holding was limited to the facts of the case. Id. at 171.
..Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982) (reaffirming that the Court's
"historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is
a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment") (citations
omitted); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Sews., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (remarking that
previous cases have "made plain beyond the need for multiple citation" that the
parental right deserves deference "absent a powerful countervailing interest")
(citation omitted).
" Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV L.
REV 1156, 1353 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
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Protecting parental rights is of paramount inportance because of the
profound role that parents play in their children's development. The
parental role is essential to the creation of socially responsible citizens and
largely beyond the competence of a large npersonal institution."
Accordingly, our national order mandates that the right of parents to direct
the care andtrammg oftheir children be granted the highest respect. As one
court has noted:
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and '[r]ights far more precious
than property rights.' 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first m the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hmder.'

1
6

B. ExaminingSection 1505/.1
Illinois presently stands alone in its attempt to prosecute parents for
failing to take steps to prevent consensual teen sex. Any other criminal
parental liability law that required parents to discourage teenage sexual
activity, however, would suffer from similar privacy problems.
1. Infringement on ParentalRights
Section 150/5.111 unreasonably impmged on the fundamental right of
parents to privacy in the affairs of family life. The wide latitude afforded
to parents in deciding how to raise their children stands in sharp contrast
to the section's constrainmg edict with respect to the enumerated act of
The Court has also upheld parents' authority over their children m the context
of challenges to that authority by the child. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602-04 (1979) (upholding a state law giving parenits the right to commit their
children to mental institutions). "Several lower federal courts explicitly have
recognized a fundamental right to family integrity based on these Supreme Court
cases." Parsley, supranote 69, at 463.
1
6 Parental control usually serves the interests of the child as well because a
parent can fulfill a child's needs in ways that an institution cannot. See Francis
Barry McCarthy, The Confised ConstitutionalStatus and Meaning ofParental
Rights, 22 GA. L. REv 975, 1017-20 (1988).
1 People v. R.G., 546N.E.2d 533,540-41 (Ill. 1989) (citing Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
165 720 ILL. CoMP STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).
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section 5/12-15(c). 1 Considering the deference that lawmakers and courts
typically have shown to parents in matters related to the family, 67 the
creation of a new duty for parents to follow m raising their children and the
subsequent imposition of criminal liability for any ensuing breach is
remarkable. By directing a parent to take "reasonable steps" to halt a
teenage sexual relationship prohibited by section 5/12-15(c), the state
substituted its judgment for that of the parent and effectively usurped the
16
parental right and obligation to nurture and direct the destiny ofthe child. 3
Moreover, children possess the right to be prepared by parents for the
responsibilities of adult life. 169 The family is "vital
in the crucial areas
17 To the
of individual motivation, personality structure, and creativeness.""
extent that application or the threat of application of a parental liability
statute such as section 150/5.1 discourages a child from confiding m the
parent regarding information of a sexual nature or from seeking advice
from the parent about matters relating to ongoing or possible future sexual
activity, the statute interferes with the right of the child to be raised by his
7
or her parent.1 1
By entrusting childcare to parents, the state fosters social pluralism and
diversity-important ideals m a society that is committed to sustaining
individual liberties. The parental right to childrearing advances not only

,61 Id. at 5/12-15(c).
aS
See supra Part V.A.
'he
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925).
169 For a discussion of a child's interest m maintaining certain relationships see
Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The ConstitutionalRight of Children to
MaintainRelationshipsWith Parent-LikeIndividuals,53 MD. L. REv. 358,385-89
(1994).
"IBruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatusofMamage,Kinship, andSexual
Pnvacy--BalancingthendivdualandSocallnterests,
81 MICH.L. REV 463,474
(1983).
171 But cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) (noting that the Court has "never had occasion to decide whether
a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her
filial relationship").
1
2 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)
("Indeed, affirmative sponsorship ofparticular ethical, religious, orpolitical beliefs
is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally
committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice."). Some
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the interests of a specific parent but also the interest "of all citizens in
preserving a society in whichthe state cannot dictate that children be reared
in a particular way."" Allowing the state to dictate childrearing bears a
discomfiting similarity to the ancient Greek version of an ideal society that
sought to indoctrinate and homogenize children. 74 Warning against any
such attempt by the state to commandeer parental childrearing authority,
the Court, m Pierce v. Society of Sisters,175 declared, "[t]he fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the state to standardize its children."176
In an apparent departure from constitutional assurances of individual
liberties, section 150/5.1's command that parents take "reasonable steps"

to prevent teen sex presumes that there exists auniversal model of adequate
parenting that is generally applicable. This broad language ignores a host
of factors, such as race, ethnicity, social class, economic status, or other
personal or socioeconomic factors that underlie and motivate childrearing
decisions. In Peoplev. Maness,'11 the defendant exercised her discretion as
a parent and chose to protect her daughter by takingthree steps. 7 8First, she
attempted to dissuade her daughter and her daughter's boyfriend from
engaging in further sexual activity. Second, because she lacked confidence
in her ability to halt her daughter's sexual relationshnp, Maness helped her
daughter obtain birthcontrol pills. Third, she allowed the boyfriend to stay
with her daughter overnight at the house. The mother recognized her
daughter's resolve to maintain the sexual relationship and feared that an

commentators rationalize the protection given parental decisions through
generalized analogies to the Bill of Rights. By guaranteeing these rights, the
Constitution makes a "statement about the form of government" and society m the
United States. The Constitution protects certain individual rights m part to
guarantee the freedom of citizens to make certain personal decisions unfettered by
conventional norms. Underthis theory, parental autonomy in childrearing decisions
flows directly from the individual right to decide to have children. See McCarthy,
supra note 163, at 1026-28.
ie Developments in theLaw-The ConstitutionandtheFamily,supranote 162,
at 1354.
74 In Meyer v. Nebraska,the Court rejected Plato's suggestions that children
be raised communally by the state and the Spartan group-education system that was
designed to develop ideal citizens. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02
(1923).
175 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
176 Id. at 535.
People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (1. 2000).
78
S id. at 548.
See
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order to cease the relationship would only spur the daughter to take her
sexual activity underground. 79 Accordingly, she resigned herself to
accepting that her parental responsibilities had moved out of the area of
control and into the area of concern for the safety of her child. Maness felt
that Lynlee was safer having sex with her boyfriend at home, where
1 80
Maness had "some control" over the situation.
Although another parent might have taken a different course of action,
Maness had the right to raise her children according to her own judgment,
given the circumstances as she believed them to be.' 1 As she contended:
Rarely do two parents agree on the best way to raise children. Rarely do
two parents agree on how best to deal with a sexually active daughter.
Although it can be argued that it is better to order a daughter to stop
having sex than it is to allow her to have sex m a safe environment, how
best to safely raise that daughter is more a question of art than of
182
science.
The approaches taken to educate, discipline, and guide a child are
infinite in variation. ' Parents are assumed to be n a position to know what
is best for their children' 8' in a world in which the effects of parental
discipline and guidance are limited by sometimes overwhelming forces in
the community at-large.18 5 Parental authority is a basic presupposition of
a free society.' As the Supreme Court has noted:

79

' See id. Mrs. Maness also was averse to terminating all contact between the
two because she did not wish her daughter to become involved with some of the
"unsavory
males" with whom her daughter had previously spent time. See id.
180 See id.
181 See generally supra Part V.A.2. (discussing the constitutional deference
accorded to parental discretion to make childrearng decisions).
"I2 Brief for Appellee at 9, People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (111. 2000) (No.
86463).
8 Not all parents would choose the same route as Kathy Maness. For example,
in People v. Hall, the parents of a teenage daughter involved in a sexual
relationship forbade her from seeing her twenty-two-year-old boyfriend. People v.
Hall, 204 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1965). Paying no heed to her parents'
admonition, the daughter crept from the house at mght and rendezvoused with her
boyfriend.
Id. at 41.
4See
11
Parham v. j.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (articulating a presumption
that 8parents
act in the best interests of their children).
" 5 See infra Part V.B.2.b.i.
86 Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
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The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks m maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important,
hstorically it has recogmzed that natural bonds of affection lead parents
17
to act in the best interests of their children.
The challenged provision, at least as the state sought to apply it in
Maness, authorized law enforcement authorities to second guess parental
decisions concerning sexual education and sexual conduct ifa parent made
a "wrong" choice-as perceived by an unforgiving police officer or
prosecutor after the fact. Hence, the Illinois General Assembly's passage
of section 150/5.1 was an inpermissible attempt to standardize parental
conduct."' The law was inconsistent with the deference that the Supreme
Court has shown toward parents m matters involving childrearing.8 9

187 Parham,442

U.S. at 602. Although the Court has also noted that a parent

may, at times, act against the interests of his or her children and that this "creates
a basis for caution," the existence of this possibility "is hardly a reason to discard
wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act
in the child's best interests. The statist notion that governmental power should
supersede parental authority
is repugnant to American tradition." Id. at 602-03
(citation omitted).
' See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
189 A joint commission of the Institute of Judicial Administration and the
Amencan Bar Association has argued that state intervention in family matters
should be limited because of our society's commitment to individual freedom and
diversity. STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT, Standard No. 1.1 cmt.
at 49-50 (Inst. of Judicial Admm.-Amencan Bar Ass'n Joint Comm. on Juvenile
Justice Standards 1981).
The statute was also mconsistent with the importance that the Supreme Court
has assigned to the right of intimate family association. The Supreme Court has
concluded that choices, to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationslups must be secured againstundue governmental intrusion because of the
role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to
our constitutional scheme. Thus, freedom of association receives protection as a
fundamental element of personal liberty. Statutes unpmgmg on the fundamental
liberty of intimate association are subject to strict scrutiny review. See Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,504-06 (1977); see alsoCHEMERINSKY, supra
note 144, § 10.2.3, at 652. The Moore Court held that a family's right of intimate association was infringed by a housing ordinance that defined "family"
narrowly, so as to preclude a grandmother from living in the same home as her
son and her two grandsons. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-06 (Powell, J., plurality
opinion).
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2. Applying Strict Scrutiny
The fundamental nature of the parental right to childrearing should
trigger strict scrutiny m review of section 150/5.1. " The United States
Constitution does not preclude Illinois from limiting the liberty interest of
parents in raising children. Under strict scrutiny review, however, a statute
"cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."''
Notwithstanding the state's compelling interest in preventing sex-related
crimes against children, 9 2 the Illinois statute was not sufficiently tailored
to effectuate that interest.' Section 150/5.1-this Article argues-was
therefore invalid not only because it was impermissibly vague, but also
because it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
a. lllinois'sCompellingInterest
The purpose of section 150/5.1 is not apparent from the text of the
statute.'9 State power to intervene in the family setting derives from two
sources-thepolicepower and theparenspatnaepower. The police power
provides the state with the power to "prescribe regulations to promote the
health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people,"' 95 as well

'oSee supraPart V.A.2.
191 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). In Meyer v. Nebraska, the
Court apparently applied a mere rational basis test. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390,401-03 (1923). Even applying the state-accommodating rational basis test, the
Court nonetheless concluded that the statute was "arbitrary and without reasonable
relation to any end within the competency of the state." Id at 403. Subsequent
decisions, however, have undoubtedly confirmed the fundamental nature of the
childrearing right. See supra Part V.A.2.
' See infra Part V.B.2.a.
9 See nfra Part V.B.2.b.
'9'For the full text of the statute, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
' 5 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,31 (1885). Tis statement, however, was
not intended to be an affirmation of plenary discretion. In the years following
Barbier,the Court limited state use of the police powerin the areas of social and
econonuc regulation. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(accepting freedom of contract as a limit on state police power and overturning a
statute restricting hours of work in bakeries). The Court's reView of regulatory
legislation affecting important social and economic interests, however, was far
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as aesthetics and family values. 1 The state's position asparenspatriae

from consistent See, e.g., Noble State Bank v Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911)
(upholding state authority to compel bank contributions to a state insurance fund);
Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding state law establishmgmaxumum
hours for female workers). In recent years, the Court has dismantled antiquated
barriers to state regulatory measures. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954) (upholding an urban renewal statute that allowed the city to condemn land
and to sell it to private developers to be redeveloped according to a renewal plan);
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining a state minimum
wage law for women). Some of its latest decisions, however, have curtailed the
traditionally wide latitude given regulation of property interests. See, e.g., Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (resurrecting protection for
property rights by requiring that a state show a clear "nexus" between regulation
and reasonable legislative purpose); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (ordering compensation
for a temporary taking).
196Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). The concept of the
"police power" defies clear definition. "An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must tun on its own facts. The definition is
essentially the product of legislative determinations. "Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
The power has been defined as:
[T]he due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the
individuals of the state, like members ofa well-govemed family, are bound
to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good
neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and
moffensive m their respective stations.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *162. By
means of the police power doctrine, state legislatures and administrative agencies
have sought to regulate a wide range of activities. See, e.g., Webster v
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (reviewing a law forbidding the
use of public funds and facilities for abortions); Johnson v. Santa Clara County,
480 U.S. 616 (1987) (addressing the legality of a sex-based voluntary affirmative
action plan); Regents of the Umv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(considering a medical school affirmative action plan that assigned a specified
number.of places in its entering class to members of minority groups); Green v
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 01968) (concerning a challenge to "freedom of
choice" plans, under which parents have the right to choose where to send their
children to school); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (addressing the
validity of state-unposed racial segregation in education); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (addressing a state law authorizing state
courts to exempt property from foreclosure).
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empowers itto protect and promote the welfare ofindividuals who lack the
capacity to act in their own best interests, including minors.' 97
Illinois called upon both police and parenspatrae powers when
enacting the Wrongs to Children Act in general as well as when enacting
and amending section 150/5.1.1 91 The Act' 99 holds liable individuals,
including parents and guardians, who cause or fail to prevent 00 certain
harms to children.2 1' In amending section 150/5.1 to expand its scope and
enhance the punishment for its violation, the Illinois General Assembly

97

See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (discussing the
state's independent interest in the welfare of children within its borders). The
parenspatraepower exists because parental rights are accompamed by duties. See
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1983); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925). The constitutional protection afforded family decisions is
predicated on the presumption that a parent will act m the best interests of his or
her child. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979); see also supra Part
V.2. When parental conduct is at odds with that belief, the state may intervene
to protect the child. Parham,442 U.S. at 603. For example, aparent's abuse of his
or her child opens the door to state involvement because such activity is beyond the
scope of the fundamental liberty right accorded to parental childrearng decisions.
See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,792
n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); see also McCarthy, supra note 163, at 1027-28
(discussing Justice White's dissent). State authority to intervene m family affairs
to protect children from parental abuse is well established. See, e.g., WARDLE,
supranote 159, § 1.09 (discussing state intervention m family matters).
'98 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).
199Id. at 150/0.01-5.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
200 Liability for failing to prevent the specified harms is limited to persons
having care, custody, or control of the child alleged to have been injured. See id.
at 150/1 (West 1993) (listing as possible parties any person having the care,
custody, or control of any child under the age of fourteen); id. at 150/5.1(A) (West
Supp. 2000) (listing as possible parties a parent, step-parent, legal guardian, or
other person having custody of a child). Knowledge of the threatened or actual
harm is required for legal responsibility to attach. See id. (requiring that a parent,
step-parent, legal guardian, or other person having custody of a child knowmngly
allow or permit an enumerated act upon his or her child).
201 See id. at 150/0.01-5.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000). Potential violations
include selling or employing a child for the purpose of singing, playing on musical
instruments, dancing, or peddling. Id. at 150/1 (West 1993). Another potential
violation is the willful abandonment of a school bus containing children by any
school l us driver. Id. at 150/4.1. The Wrongs to Children Act also provides for the
transfer to the court ofcustody of a child whose guardian has been convicted under
a provision of the Act. Id. at 150/3.
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stated that the changes "are of vital concern to the people of this state and
legislative action concerning [the changes] is necessary."2 2 Pursuant to its
police power, a state can prevent and pumsh acts that threaten the safety of
its citizens. 0 3 Thus, Illinois can defend section 150/5.1 as necessary to
safeguard Illinois children from harm caused by the wrongful acts of third
parties or the wrongful acts or omissions of their parents or those having
child custody.2m In addition, if the welfare of Illinois children is at stake,
Illinois, acting as parens patnae,may circumscribe the privacy right of
parents to raise their children by means of section 150/5.1.
Notwithstanding the legislature's general proclamation that the
provision is of "vital concern" to the people of Illinois, the legislative
record sheds little light on the Assembly's particular rationale for extending
its mandate to parents whose adolescent children have adolescent sexual
partners.0 5 The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
section 5/12-15(c),2 the statute that crimnalizes teen sex, "is to protect
children who are 13 to 16 years old from the consequences of premature
sexual experiences."2 7 Senate discussions about the criminal sexual abuse

= Pub. Act 91-696, art. 50, sec. 50-10, 2000 Il. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-696
(West,
WESTLAW through 2000 Legis. Sess.).
203 See supranotes 195-96
and accompanying text.
Although the provision punishes parents and others having custody of
children for "permitting the sexual abuse of a child," it also aims to prevent the
abuse and assault from occurring. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp.
2000) (requiring parents and those with custody to take "reasonable steps" to
prevent abuse or assault). The latter goal indirectly protects children from the
wrongful acts of third parties.
205
See Pub. Act 91-696, art. 50, sec. 50-10, 2000 M1.Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-696
(West, WESTLAW through 2000 Legis. Sess.).
206 720 ILL. COM STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000).
' People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Ill. 1992). In Reed, the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of section 5/12-15(d), Illinois's aggravated criminal
sexual abuse statute. The defendant argued that the statute violated the equal
protection rights ofolder perpetrators because it imposed a more severe penalty for
criminal sexual assault of persons between the ages of thirteen through sixteen
where the perpetrator is five or more years older than the victim. The penalty is
more harsh than that imposed under section 5/12-15(c), which applies when the
perpetrator is less than five years older than the victim. Id. at 458. The court.
determined that classifications based on age need only bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate state goal and held that the Illinois legislature could rationally
conclude that adults who are five or more years older than their minor sexual
partners pose a greater risk of harm than offenders closer in age to their victims.
See id. at 458-59.
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law, however, indicated concern about the reach of that statute, which, as
pointed out by Senator David Barkhausen, extended to situations that do
not involve the use of force by the perpetrator. 2 ° Discussion about the
statutes crinmmalizmg sexual conduct with minors centered on the need to
raise the age of consent in Illinois from fifteen to sixteen years of age.2P 9
The record reveals that the impetus for this change was the large number
of sixteen-year-old sexual assault victims seen by law enforcement
personnel or crime victim counselors.2 1°

Nonetheless, concern for the physical and emotional well-being of
young adolescents likely spurred state legislators to include teenage sexual
activity in the prohibitions of the parental responsibility statute.21 In
particular, current studies on teenage sexual activity tracking the substantial
drop in the age at which teenagers first engage in sexual intercourse 12 may
S.85-569, at 82 (111. 1987) (on file with author) ("My basic concern
are
those situations . that do not. involve force in which case we're going all
the way up to a Class II felony."). The Senator was also worried about the
application of the statute to situations that involve sexual conduct other than sexual
intercourse. Id.
209 See id. at 80-81.
21 See id. at 80. In particular, Senator Netsch was concerned about the
frequency of assaults perpetrated against sxteen-year-olds by adult authority
figures, such as teachers, and opined that, "with respect to sixteen-year-olds
generally, there need[s] to be some adjustment m the ages involved in the more
serious of the crimes involving criminal sexual abuse." Id. at 81. Senator Netsch
was also troubled by the numbers of sixteen-year-olds assaulted by those in charge
ofinstitutions.Seeid. SenatorBarkhausenagreedwith SenatorNetsch's comments
about strengthening the penalties for sexual assault by authority figures, but urged
the Senate to direct the legislation toward those taking advantage oftheir influence
over a child, as opposed to defining crimes simply in terms of age differentials. See
id. at 82.
21 Health professionals and school officials are concerned about the health and
emotional ramifications of sexual experimentation for young people between the
ages21of
ten and thirteen. See Jarrell, supra note 1.
2 For
a comparison ofpercentages of sexually-active fifteen-year-olds in 1999
and the early 1970s, see supranote 6. According to Dr. Robert Blum, a physician
and the director of the Division of General Pediatrics and Adolescent Health at the
Umversity of Minnesota: "There are significant numbers of youngsters who are
engaging in sexual activity at earlier ages.
Besides intercourse, they are
engaging in oralFsex, mutual masturbation, nudity and exposure as precursors to
intercourse." Jarrell, supra note 1. Richard Gallagher, director of the Parenting
Institute at New York Umversity's Child Study Center, has said: "I see no reason
not to believe that soon a substantial number of youths will be having intercourse
20
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It's already happemng."Id. Although the Centers
m the middle-school years.
for Disease Control and Prevention reports that, since 1991, the number of high
school teens who have had sexual intercourse has dropped from fifty-four percent
to forty-eight percent, Gallagher believes that these numbers distract us from the
increase in sexual activity among middle school students. He noted: "You can get
And then you can
16- to 18-year-olds who will be very conservative sexually.
get right below them a group of 14- to 16-year-olds who say those older students
are too conservative, let's party." Id.
Additionally, half of the nation's high school kids say that they lack basic
information on sexually transmitted diseases and forty percent said they do not
know enough about birth control. See Lillian Lee Kim, Study: Teens LackFactson
Sexual Health,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 20, 1999, at C3, 1999 WL 3806010.
This, coupled with the fact that a high percentage of young people have multiple
sexual partners, has ledto several disturbing trends. See VernaNoel Jones, Sexually
Transmitted Diseases: A Ticking Time Bomb for Teens, CHI. TRm. (Southwest
Edition), July 25, 1999, at Family 3, 1999 WL 2895827
First, this country's teen pregnancy rate remams the highest mthe industrialized
world. Jarrell, supra note 1. The United States teenage birth rate is twice as high
as the United Kingdom's birth rate, three times as high as Australia's, four times
as high as Germany's, six times as high as France's, and fifteen times as high as
Japan's. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., WHEN TEENS HAVE SEX: ISSUES AND
TRENDS (1998), http:l/www.aecf.org/ladscount/teen/overview/overview.htm.
Annually, almost one million teenagers become pregnant, though not all of these
pregnancies result in childbirth, because of abortions and miscarriages. THE ALAN
GUTrrMACHERINSTITUTE, supra note 1. Seventy-eight percent of teen pregnancies
are not planned, accounting for one-quarter of accidental pregnancies annually. Id.
Although the teen birth rate has been falling since 1991, anxiety over teenage
pregnancy has continued. See Elizabeth Hollenberg, Note, The Crminalizationof
Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REv 267, 269 (1999). One commentator has suggested that the
persistence of this anxiety shows that society's true concern is "not fundamentally
about babies, but about farther-reachmg demographic changes occurring over the
same period, such as increased sexual activity among teenagers." Id. Illinois in
particular has experienced a problem with teen pregnancies. In Illinois, there were
42,510 pregnancies among women between the ages of fifteen and nineteen in
1996. THE ALAN GUTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: OVERALL
TRENDSANDSTATE-BY-STATEINFORMATION (1999),http://www.agl-usa.org/pubs/
teen.regstats.html. This figure placed Illinois in the top five states with the
highest number of pregnancies among adolescent women. Id. The number of
pregnancies among Illinois women between fifteen and seventeen years of age was
17,380, among eighteen and mneteen-year-olds the number was 25,130. Id. That
same year, the pregnancy rate statewide for women in this age group was 106
pregnancies per 1000 women. Id. In 1985, the rate among those between fifteen
and nmeteen years of age was 103 pregnancies per 1000 women-im both 1988 and
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explain the state interest m expanding the parental liability statute. News
reports and articles releasing tiese figures have drawn the attention of the
public eye, and the American public has reacted with concern and disbelief.
One response has been a crackdown on teenage sex with abstinence-only
initiatives. 21 3 Over the past few years, the abstinence-only movement has
gamed momentum.214 Advocates of these programs argue that "an
unambiguous abstinence message
will curb teen pregnancies, decrease
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases[,] . and make for 'sexually
healthier' adults."2 15 The growth of these initiatives may have fueled
legislative interest in including teenage sexual activity within the scope of
the parental liability law
At its core, the law embodied the unassailable goal of protecting the
welfare of children.2 1 6 The tragic consequences of sexual mistreatment,

1992, 112 per 1000. Id.
A second disturbing trend is the outbreak of AIDS cases. In 1998, 1798 new
AIDS cases were, nationwide, among individuals below the age of twenty-five.
Leonard Pitts, Jr., Too Scaredto TalkAbout Sex to Teens, OREGONIAN (Portland),
June 5, 2000, at Eli, 2000 WL 5407744.
Finally, the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases is on the rise. Of the
estimated fifteen million sexually transmitted diseases diagnosed each year
(excluding
AIDS diagnoses), two-thirds afflict young people. See Jones, supra.
213
See supranotes 9-12 and accompanying text.
2"4 See supra note 10. One of these programs is sponsored by Project Reality,
an Illinois-based organization that promotes and distributes abstinence-only
curricula. SeeProject Reality, athtttp://www.projectreality.org. ProjectReality has
programs m more than 300 Illinois schools.Id. Moreover, Illinois law requires that:
All public elementary, jumor high, and senior high school classes thatteach
sex education and discuss sexual intercourse shall emphasize that abstinence
is the expected norm in that abstinence from sexual intercourse is the only
protection that is 100% effective against unwanted teenage pregnancy,
sexually transmitted diseases, and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
("AIDS") when transmitted sexually.
105 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/27-9.1(b) (West 1998).
215 Morse, supra note 10, at 79.

See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the statute's
imposition of parental liability if a parent knowingly allows or permits criminal
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault
of a child, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse). Disappointed that the Illinois
Supreme Court invalidated the statute, Lisa Hoffman, supervisor of the state
attorney general's criminal appeals division, said, "There are other situations that
people might find more abhorrent [than that in Maness]. The [law] is no longer
available in those cases either. Prosecutors are without a tool under which they
216
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exploitation, or assault for a child victim give rise to the compelling state
interest that justifies the legislative action.2 17 The Illinois Supreme Court,
mIn re WalterB.2 18 - the only case otherthaunManessthat invokes section
150/5.1--confirmed this governmental goal.219 In this case, the court
reviewedthe state's petition for adjudication ofthe wardship ofa five-year-

can charge people who are permitting sexual abuse of ther children." Christopher
Wills, Court Strikes Law Requiring Parents to Prevent Some Teen Sex,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 15,2000, WESTLAW, 6/15/00 APWIRES

18:24:00 (second alteration m original).
Many states hold parents criminally liable for failing to protect their children
from abuse. See Anne T. Johnson, Note, CriminalLiabilityforParents Who Fail
to Protect,5 LAW & INEQ. 359,365-68 (1987) (discussing child abuse laws in the
United States). "As the problem of child abuse continues to grow in tlus country,
states are willing to take more drastic measures to stop harm to children." Id. at
375. In most cases, courts have upheld the constitutionality of these laws. See, e.g.,
United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding conviction of a
mother for failing to seek medical attention for her son after her husband fatally
beat hIn); Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the
conviction of a father for failing to prevent child abuse by hIs wife), rev'd on other
grounds,805 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1991); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis.
1986) (upholding the conviction of aparent for leaving the children with the other
parent, who physically and sexually abused them).
2 7
Inhis dissent in People v. Maness, Chef Justice Harrison stated that the
parental liability law was justified because the parental interest in ,making
childrearing decisions must give way to the state's interest in combating child
abuse and neglect. People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545, 553 (Ill.
2000) (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting). The dissent developed its rationale for this particular finding by
likening the consensual sex between Lynlee and Owens to the use of illicit
substances. Id. The dissent acknowledged the "'fundamental liberty interest [of
parents] in the care, custody, and management of their child[ren]."' Id. (second
alteration m original) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753-54 (1982)).
The dissent, however, maintained:
The right to be a parent does not encompass the right to abuse one's child
or to allow one's child to be abused. If Maness had knowingly allowed
Owens to rnject her daughter with heroin and provided the couple with a
place m her home where the drugs could be rejected, there would be no
question that Maness could be prosecuted for child endangerment
or
worse, without offending the constitution. The result should not be different
because the abuse involves illegal sex rather than illegal drugs.
Id. (citation omitted).
218 In re Walter B., 592 N.E.2d 274 (Il. App. Ct.), appeal denied sub nom.
People v. Walter B., Sr., 602 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. 1992).
211 See In re WalterB., 592 N.E.2d at 279.
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old child based on alleged sexual abuse, neglect, and physical abuse of the
child by his parents 2 ° According to the facts of the case, the father was
orally sodomizing the boy and the mother was aware that this was
happening. 221 The court stated that the mother had violated section 150/5.1
by permitting the sexual abuse of her five-year-old son.'
Sexual mistreatment, exploitation, or assault of children, however,
bears little resemblance to situations involving consensual sexual activity
among adolescents. The degree of difference is evident m the criminal
sexual abuse statute itself: an accused who commits an act of sexual
msconduct by physically threatening the victim or by intentionally taking
advantage of an unconscious victim commits a Class 4 felonyin while a
fourteen-year-old who engages m consensual sexual intercourse with
another fourteen-year-old commits a Class AmIsdemeanor. 4 By assiging
violations of section 5/12-15(c) misdemeanor status, Illinois legislators
attest to society's appreciation for this difference and signal our instinct
that consensual sexual activity among teen contemporaries is not really
sexual abuse.' It is only deemed equivalent to sexual abuse by operation
of the statute.? 6 Breaches of section 5/12-15(c) by teens engaging in
consensual sexresemble status offenses like truancy and curfew violations.
A child may be charged and adjudged delinquent for these acts, whereas
there would be no chargeable offense at all if the child were an adult;
prosecution is based solely on the child's "status" as a minor. 7
See id. at 276.
See id. at 276-79.
mId. at 279.
n3 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(d) (West Supp. 2000) (designating
violations of section 5/12-15(a)(1) & (2) as a Class 4 felony).
4 d. (designating
violations of section 5/12-15(c) as a Class A misdemeanor).
Pursuant to this provision, consensual sexual conduct between a thirteen-year-old
and a person between thirteen and seventeen years of age, a fourteen-year-old and
a person between fourteen and eighteen years of age, a fifteen-year-old and a
person between fifteen and nineteen years of age, or a sixteen-year-old and a
person between sixteen and twenty years of age is a misdemeanor. See id. at 5/1215(c)-(d).
I Cf supranote 34 (discussing situations in which an adolescent and is or her
sexual partner are not contemporaries).
" 6 See supranote 121 (discussing statutory rape). Similartreatment is accorded
violations ofsection 5/12-15(b), which forbids consensual sexual activity between
individuals between nine and sixteen years of age and a partner under seventeen
years of age. See 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(b) (West Supp. 2000). A
breach of section 5/12-15(b) is also a Class A misdemeanor. Id. at 5/12-15(d).
227 See BINDER ET AL., supra note 63, at 21-26.
220
221
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The issue of consensual sex among teen contemporaries is also
distinguishable from situations involving adults who are five or more years
older than their minor partners. Age-disparate pairings pose a greater risk
of harm because of "the significant difference[s] in levels of intellectual
and emotional maturity
between an adult and Ins or her minor sexual
partner." Consequently, "an age difference of five or more years between
an adult and hIs or her minor sexual partner may in itself constitute
overreaching."2 9 The penalty imposed for relationships with significant
age-differentials bears out this distinction: if the accused is five or more
years older than the victim, the offense is a Class 2 felony.2 °
The lack of reported cases prosecuted under sections 150/5.1 and 5/1215(c) further highlights the difference between consensual teen sex and
sexual mistreatment, exploitation, and assault. The rare enforcement of
these statutes reflects not only society's reluctance to pumshteenagers who
engage in sexual conduct, but also our unwillingness to brand as criminals
parents who do not espouse or who do not enforce an abstinence-only point
of view. Since the law's effective date of January 11, 1989, no cases
prosecuting parental failures to discourage teen sex have been reported,
other than the Maness case.? 1
The virtual non-enforcement of section 150/5.1 and the spotty
enforcement of section 5/12-15(c) reflect society's inner conflict about the
point at which teenagers are able to consent meaningfully to sexual
activity 232Age-of-consent laws represent a governmental determination of
the point at which consent between age-disparate partners is not possible. 3
Legislative attempts to establishthis cut-offpomt, however, are necessarily

8 State v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 459 (111. 1992).

29

Id.

230 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16(g) (West Supp. 2000). A Class 2 felony
is punishable by three to seven years in prison. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8l(a)(5) (West Supp. 2000).
23 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1, Historical and Statutory Notes
(West Supp. 2000).
232 In the context of sexual relations, "the best-known example [of a source of
a defect m consent] is immaturity: the law has long prohibited consensual
intercourse with
[an individual] . below the legally prescribed age of consent." Schulhofer, supranote 121, at 101.Butcf B.B.v. State, 659 So. 2d256 (Fla.
1995) (holding that minors do have a privacy right to engage in consensual sex, in
a case involving consensual sex between two sixteen-year-olds).
23 Legislatures created "age of consent" laws in the late 1800s to deal with
child prostitution. MIKE A. MALES, THE SCAPEGOAT GENERATiON: AMERICA'S
WAR ON ADOLESCENTS 49 (1996).
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fraught with difficulties, given the tremendous variation m both physical
andpsychosexual development among adolescents. 3 4 The Illinois Supreme
Court articulatedtis ambivalence towardteenage sexual activity mPeople
v. Reed 2 51
We agree with the State that what may be considered sexual experimentation by a 15-year-old girl and her 18-year-old boyfriend may be sexual
exploitation if the boyfriend is 20.
When young sexual partners are
less than five years apart in age, their levels of maturity are more nearly
equal and the opportunity for overreaching is diminished.?
If moral questions about sexual intimacy among young teens provoked
the legislation at issue, Illinois's interest in enforcing the parental
responsibility provision may not be a compelling one. Considermg the lack
of societal consensus as to whether adolescent sexual experimentation is
illegal or immoral, any governmental interest in monitoring teenage sexual
activity is arguably less than vital and, when pitted against the constitutional right ofparents to raise their children free from the prying eyes ofthe
7
state, folds under strict scrutiny.?

If, however, the General Assembly has determined that sexual
experimentation among teens under seventeen years of age jeopardizes the
well-being of those adolescents, 8 then Illinois may have a compelling

' See id. at 58-59. These difficulties explain the conflicts that often exist
between laws establishing age of consent to engage in sexual conduct and laws
establishing age of consent to marry. While "some states will allow a minor to
marry with parental permission at an age when the minor cannot engage in legal
sexual activity,
others allow a minor to engage in sexual activity years before
he or she can marry without parental approval." RICHARD A. POSNER &
KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GuIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 45 (1996).
235 People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455 (El. 1992).
236
Id. at 458-59.
1 Further calling into question the propriety of section 150/5.1, the American
,Medical Association has adopted a policy endorsing the view that "the primary
responsibility for family life education is mthe home" and supporting "the concept
of a complementary family life and sexuality education program in the schools at
all levels." AM. MED. ASS'N, REPORT 7 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFC AFFAIRS

(1-99) (1999), http'//www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf online/pf online. Inajoint-effort
with the United States Surgeon General, the American Medical Association will
design programs consistent with this policy for communities of color and youth in
high-rsk situations. Id.
'8 See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
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reason for requiring parents to prevent their teens from engaging in such
behavior. Assuming that such a compelling reason exists, the statute's
mandate to parents must then be evaluated within the confines of the
tension between the state's dutyto respect the fundamental privacy interest
of parents in directing the upbringing oftheir children and maintaining the
integrity of the family without intrusion from government, and the state's
purpose in protecting children in particular and the best interests of society
in general. In effect, the application of a parental liability statute to a
situation sinilar to that mManess represents a legislative judgment that the
state's interests surpass those of the parent or family with respect to
adolescent sexual experimentation. The foremost motivating factors
leading to this conclusion are likely an amalgam of concern for the
emotional and physical health of the nation's youth,1 9 and moral outrage
over and condemnation of sexual activity out of wedlock.24°
b. The "Means-Ends" Fit
A state may restrict parental discretion when necessary to protect the
child's welfare only when the means used to limit the fundamental liberty
interest in rmsmg children are closely fitted to that end.24 ' Assuming that
Illinois's compelling interest mregulatingparental conduct through section
150/5.1 is to protect adolescents from the health and emotional risks of
sexual experimentation caused by violations of section 5/12-15(c),242 the
" Federally funded abstinence-only education requires that children be taught
the "'harmful psychological and physical effects' of premarital sex." Morse, supra
note 10, at 79.
240 The primary goal of abstinence-only education programs is to persuade
teenagers to delay sexual conduct until marriage. See id. Robert Rector, a senior
research fellow at the Heritage Foundation who helped draft the G.O.P welfarereform legislation that created these programs, explains: "The programs simply tell
[children that] the more sex they have outside ofmarriage, the less will be their
prospects for human happiness." Id.
241See supranotes 137-48 and accompanying text. Mere failure to be a model
parent or guardian does not, however, strip the custodian of his or her fundamental
liberty interest in childrearing. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
Even a compelling interest does not give states free license to interfere in family
life. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (stating that the "notion that
governmental power should supersede parental authority mall cases because some
parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition"). Rather, the
state must show that its interference will further its goal of protecting children. See
Roe242
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
See supranotes 206-15 and accompanying text.
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question is whether policing parental behavior is closely related to that
goal. The answer must be a resounding "no."
As illustrated in the following discussion, prosecuting parents of teens
involved in consensual sexual relationships with other teens falls short of
satisfying the means-ends test because pursuing parents and those with
legal custody over teens is unlikely to dissuade teenage sexual activity.
Teens decide to have sex for reasons that are multiple and complex; 243
targeting parents to quiet state concerns about the welfare of teenagers will
have little effect on teenage decisions to initiate sexual activity.244
Moreover, directing prosecutorial interest at parents could also adversely
affect the family unit and leave the teen without parental assistance and
advice.24 5 In addition, the Illinois parental liability statute is inconsistent
with other Illinois laws that cede to parents authority over decisions
regarding birth control and sexual education-accentuating the poor fit
between state interest and goal. 4 The resulting conflict of laws frustrates
efforts by parents to exercise their rights and meet their obligations as
parents.
z. Accessories to Teenage Sexual Activity
Adolescent sexual activity is not necessarily a function of lack of
parental supervision andtraming. A recent study bythe Children's Hospital
of Philadelphia reveals that the driving force behind teen sexual activity is
peer pressure 4 Students who believed that most oftheirpeers had already
had sex were two and one-half times more likely to report a high intention
to initiate sexual intercourse in the upcoming school year.4 "As adolescents perceive their peers to be initiating a new behavior, they alter their
own behavior to reflect their perceptions of normative behavior."2 49 "The
243 See
244 See

mnfra Part V.B.2.b.i.
infra Part V.B.2.b.ii.
25 See infra Part V.B.2.b.iii.
I See infra Part V.B.2.b.v.
247 See News Release, The
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, supra note 7
The study was published m the November 1998 issue of PEDIATRICS. Sara B.
Kinsman et al., Early Sexual Initiation:The Role ofPeerNorms, 102 PEDIATRICS
1185 (1998).
1 Kinsman et al., supra note 247, at 1189. Using confidential questionnaires,
researchers surveyed 1389 adolescents m Philadelphia public schools at the
beginning
and end of the sixth grade. Id. at 1187
2
9Id. at 1190.
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main motivation for adolescents to participate in sexual activity is not
because 'it's cool' but because they don't want to be left behnd."2 0°
The media also shape teen attitudes toward sex. Research clearly links
watching programs high in sexual content with early initiation of adolescent sexual intercourse."' Teenagers watch an average of three hours of
television a day3P In the United States, approximately one in four
television programs contains a scene primarily devoted to depicting sexual
behavior; one in eight contains a scene in which intercourse is either
depicted or strongly implied. 2-4 The negative consequences of sexual
behavior andthe taking ofsexualprecautions, however, are rarely shown. s

10 News Release, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, supranote 7. The
study also found that thirty percent of the students entering the sixth grade had
already experienced sexual intercourse; five percent reported having initiated
sexual intercourse during the sixth grade school year; and fifty percent of the
sexually-experienced reported ahigh intentionto have sex at somepoint during the
school year. Kinsman et al., supra note 247, at 1187
Initiation of sexual activity other than intercourse is occurring among very
young adolescents, including those mtheirpre-teen years. In particular, adolescents
are engaging in oral and anal sex because they can remain sexually active, but
without the risk of pregnancy. Marsha Levy-Warren, a psychologist, says,
I see girls, seventh- and eighth-graders, even smxth-graders, who tell me
they're virgins, and they're going to waitto have intercourse until they meet
the man they'll marry. But then they've had oral sex 50 or 60 times. It's like
a goodmght kass to them, how they say goodbye after a date.
Jarrell,supra note 1.
11 See Dale Kunkel et al., SexualMessageson Television: ComparingFindings
from Three Studies, 36 L SEXRES. 230 (1999), 1999 WL 18685878.
1 Victor C. Strasburger, Tuning in to Teenagers,NEWsWEEK, May 19, 1997,
at 18. In addition, teenagers "listen to the radio for an additional one to two hours
[per day] and often have access to R-rated movies and even pornography." Id. A
study from the late 1980s shows that teenagers view "almost 15,000 sexual jokes,
innuendoes, and other references on TV each year." Id.
3Kunkel et al., supra note 251.
Id. "Sex is everywhere, and it's absolutely explicit. . There's hardly a film
that doesn't show a man and a woman having sex. There's MTV, lurid rap lyrics,
and now we've got technosex on the Internet." Jarrell, supranote 1 (quoting Dr.
Allen Waltznan, a New York psychiatrist who sees many adolescent patients).
255 Kunkel et al., supra note 251. Public concern has pushed television writers
and producers to make story lines about sex more realistic by including information
about and scenes depicting the possible consequences of sexual conduct. See
Stodghill, supra note 4, at 56. Groups like the Kaiser Family Foundation have
consulted on television programs in an attempt to "improve the public-health
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These television portrayals play a role m the sexual socialization of
children. When asked about sexual content on television, one thirteen-yearold responded, "You name the show, and I've heard about
[sex]-Jerry
Springer,MTV, Dawson's Creek, HBO After Midnight.""6 Not surprisingly, many adolescents regularly seek answers to their questions about sex
from television. 57 The ubiquitous messages about sex are not limited to
entertainment television. Sex is everywhere, even on the news. From the
White House sex scandal to the public discussions about sexually
transmitted diseases like AIDS andherpes, children m the United States are
bombarded daily with information about sex.2s8 This excessive mdoctrination has contributed not only to higher sex I.Q.s among youths, but also to
a widespread indifference toward sex and sexual conduct. 2s9
Among the many forces that power the adolescent quest for carnal
knowledge-the rising divorce rate, inattentive parents, peer norms,
promotional and entertainment media filled with sexual content and
innuendo-the most frequent explanation is that today's culture conveys
content" ofthe shows. Id. (quoting Matt James, a Kaiser senior vice president). The
Kaiser Family Foundation has consulted on daytime soaps, such as General
Hospitaland One Life to Live, and prume-time dramas, such as ER, about a variety
of subjects, including teen pregnancy. Id.
' Stodghill, supra note 4, at 54. Dawson's Creek, one of the most widelywatched shows on television, is also one of the mostexplicit shows on teen
sexuality. The program centers around the lives of a handful of teenagers, growing
up and coming into their own. Dawson's Creek (WB Television Network, 2000).
" Channel-surfing answers many a question about sex. According to a
fourteen-year-old in Denver, "Ifyou watch TV, they've got everything you want
to know.
That's how I learned to kiss, when I was eight." Stodghill, supranote
4, at 56. A sixteen-year-old from Florida, who lost her virginity when she was
fourteen years of age, says, "You can learn a lot about sex from cable. It's all madsex stuff." Id. at 54. Teens are also tuning in to information talk shows that focus
on sex. MTV's Loveline, an hour-long question-and-answer show about sex and
sexuality, is very popular among teens. The show features sex expert Dr. Drew
Pinsky, who answers questions posed by adolescents and young adults over the
telephone. "Dr. Drew has some excellent advice," says a Denver eighth-grade
student. Id. at 56.
2"8 Rationalizing their sexual conduct, boys at a middle school in Denver,
Colorado stated, "Ifthe President can do it, why can't we?" Id. at 53.
" "Teens today are almost nonchalant about sex. It's like we've been to the
moon too many times," says ajumor ugh counselor in Salt Lake City. Id. at 54. In
a discussion about sexual themes in the media, one seventh grader stated, "It's like
everywhere,
even in Skateboarding [magazine]. It's become so normal it
doesn't even affect you." Id. at 59 (alteration in original).
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a mixed message to our children. Although nmety-three percent of
Americans believe that sexual education should be taught in high schools
and eighty-four percent believe it should be taught in middle orjumor high
schools, adults are uncertain about how they feel about teenage sexual
activity.26 Parents seem inclined toward two seemingly contradictory
approaches: 1) advocating abstinence or 2) encouraging prophylactics and,
arguably, thus endorsing sexual activity. Many schools in the United States
teach abstinence as the sole contraception method,2 6' yet kids are confronted daily with messages about sex. Consequently, "[m]any kids are torn
between living up to amoral code espousedby their church and parents and
trying to stay true to the swirling laissez-fare."262
ii. Lack ofParentalControl
The analytical difficulty with introducing an abstinence-only standard
into a parental responsibility law ultimately centers on the gray area
between parental control and teenage autonomy.2 63 Many relationships and
situations outside of the home and family are effectively beyond parental
jurisdiction. 2 " Although a parent or legal custodian must have knowledge
I See supranotes 116-21 and accompanying text. "You start out talking about
condoms in this country, and you end up fighting about the future ofthe American
family." Stodghill, supra note 4, at 58 (quoting Sarah Brown, director of the
Campaign Against Teen Pregnancy).
is! See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
Stodghil, supra note 4, at 59.
As teens mature, they begin to make their own life decisions, including
decisions about sexuality. Expecting parents to control the sexual activities of their
teens could result m vicarious liability for parents.
I The issue of control leads to causation concerns. See generally Arthur
Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV 547
(1988) (criticizing the concept of legal duty as a limit on liability for omissions).
Unless the parental liability law is carefully drafted to reflect a parent's reasonable
ability to exert control over the child, the statute will likely violate the principle of
causation. Inmostjursdictions, to warrant criminal sanction, a defendant's conduct
must be both the actual and proximate cause of the resulting harm. See LAFAVE,
supra note 56, § 3.12, at 292-93. Ifaparent lacks control overhis or her child, then
taking or failing to take "reasonable steps" to prevent the child from engaging in
sexual intercourse will do little to effect a change in such behavior. The existence
of a parent-child relationship does not prove causation; the parent's actions must
foreseeably lead to the child's sexual activity. The absence of a causal linkbetween
the parent's actions and the sexual conduct removes the parent from the reach of
the cnminal liability statute.
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ofthe child's sexual activities before liability can attach pursuant to section
150/5.1,1 the use of such an ordinance to control juvenile sexual behavior
is questionable. The statute extends the parent's duty ofsupervision beyond
realistic expectations of parental capacities. The responsibilities of
parenthood unquestionably include the duty to guide the child's personal
development. A parent's ability to supervise the child, however, seldom
remains constant throughout the child's life.2 As the child grows up,
maturity and competing social forces dilute parental influence, weakening
the parent's command over the child. ' Section 150/5.1 is oblivious to the
changingnature ofparental control, which results in parents bemgpumshed
not for their own acts or omissions, but for those of their children.
When a parent learns that his or her teen is willingly involved m sexual
conduct with another teen, the list of parenting alternatives is long. For
example, a parent might forbid the teen from continuing the sexual
relationship or insist that the teen completely cease spending time with his
or her partner. Or, if the behavior is not limited to a single partner, the
parent nght promulgate a ban on sexual activities altogether. A parent
could also condemn the teen's actions and, perhaps, punish the child in
some manner. Another option might be to educate the teen about the
emotional and physical consequences of sexual behavior and advise the
teen that abstaining from sexual conduct is the wisest solution for all
concerned. A parent may choose to inform the parents or custodians of the
teen's partner or partners, or a parent might report the conduct to proper
authorities-the police or a state prosecuting attorney.268

I Liability pursuant to section 150/5.1 is predicated on the parent's actual
knowledge of the sexual activities. 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 150/5.1(A) (West
Supp. 1000) (requiring that "[a] parent
knowingly allow[ ] or permit[ ] an act
of criminal sexual abuse
upon his or her child") (emphasis added).
266
See GERALDRL ADAMS ET AL., ADOLESCENT LIFE EXPERIENCES 98-101 (3d
ed. 1994); J. ROY HOPKINS, ADOLESCENCE: THE TRANSiTIONAL YEARS 13, 215
(1983); Charles E. Bowerman & John W Kinch, Changes in Family and Peer
Orientationof ChildrenBetween the Fourthand Tenth Grades,37 SOc. FORCES
206, 207 (1959); Wyndol Furman, The Development of Children's Social
Networks,in CHILDREN'S SOCIALNEWORKS AND SOCIAL SUPPORTS 151 (Deborah
Belle ed., 1989).
26 See HOPKINS, supranote 266, at 215-16; Thomas J. Bemdt, Developmental
Changesin Conformity to PeersandParents,15 DEv. PSYCHOL. 608, 615 (1979);
Bowerman & Kinch, supra note 266, at 207; David A. Utech & Kenneth L.
Hoving, ParentsandPeersas CompetingInfluences in the Decisionsof Children
ofDiffenngAges, 78 . SOC. PSYCHOL. 267,272 (1969).
m Ignoring, encouraging, or approving of such conduct would, arguably,
violate a statute similar to section 150/5.1.
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Possible outcomes resulting from these courses of action are many, and
vary as to the extent of their achievement of governmental goals and
unpact on parental rights. A specific or blanket prohibition of sexual
activity may be the sinplest solution; it may also be futile.269 More than
half of today's schoolchildren are latchkey children.27 0 When coupled with
the decline of two-parent households, this leaves adolescents with less, if
not little, supervision. Not only are kids mundated with messages about
sex, they have more time to engage m it. If parents are working, they may
be unable to exercise reasonable control and supervision over their children
dunng the hours between three and seven p.m., the time when most
adolescents are out of school andparents have not yet returned home from
work.27' Numerous opportunities abound forteens to be totally independent
of their parents-while attending school, social events, or participating m
extracurncular activities. What is more, adolescence is the period in most
young lives when a child begins to spend less time with ns or her parents
and initiates his or her own social relationships. 27 As the teen seeks to
exert greater autonomy over his or her affairs, parental control and
influence is correspondingly dinmished?3 It is in these years that parents,
however reluctantly, make the transition from control to guidance in the
lives of their children. Consequently, parental efforts to condemn the
sexual conduct or to punish the teen may be ineffective in preventing
further sexual activity.
Opting to educate the child about the risks ofsexual behavior may offer
hun or her needed emotional as well as informational support but, without
at least a firm recommendation of abstinence, the parent runs the risk of
having his or her actions perceived by legal authorities as sanctioning the
I A case on point is People v. Hall,in which two teens were involved in a
sexual relationslp. People v. Hall, 204 N.E.2d 40 (111. App. Ct. 1965). Upon
learnmg of the sexual nature of the relationship, the parents of the girl demanded
thai she stop seeing her boyfnend. Despite the prohibition, the daughter slipped
away from the family home to meet with her boyfriend. Id. at 41.
270 See Howard Hayghe, Worlang Mothers Reach Record Number in 1984,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1984, at 31, 32.
2 1 For example, "[o]ne 13-year-old boy at a junior lugh school in Manhattan
[says that] he first had oral sex at [the age of] 12 and has had it about eight
times at parties and in the hours between 4 and 7 p.m., before [his] parents come
home from work." Jarrell, supra note 1.
27
2 See ADAMs ETAL.,supra note 266, at 98-99; HOPKINS,supra note 266, at 13,
215; Bowerman &Kinch, supranote 266, at 207; Furman, supra note 266, at 151.
273 See HopKiNs, supra note 266, at 215-16; Berndt, supra note 267, at 615;
Bowerman &Kinch, supra note 266, at 207; Utech & Hoving, supranote 267, at
272.
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teen's conduct. A weak abstinence message might run afoul of a statute
similar to section 150/5.1. Anything beyond counseling abstinence,
however, nght be seen by the child as intruding on the teen's authority
over his or her own interactions. Regardless of the force used to back the
communication to abstain from sexual relations, parental authority over an
adolescent child is uncertain. Advising a parent or guardian of the other
teen about the sexual conduct confronts comparable difficulties. In addition
to expanding potential liability under the statute to another party, this
avenue does not guarantee a cessation of sexual activity Reporting the
conduct to law enforcement individuals-a more extreme alternative-triggers the risk that one or both teens will be criminally charged for
their actions.
iii. Harm to the Parent-ChildRelationship
Exercising any or all of the aforementioned options could also
negatively impact a parent's relationship with his or her teen. Disapproval
in any form-proscnption, reprimand, pumshment, or criticism-may
cause a teen to refrain from sharing information about sexual
expenences.2 7 4 Although this might safeguard the parent from criminal
prosecution pursuant to a statute similar to section 150.5/1, when a parent
is cut out of the information loop he or she cannot provide assistance or
advice when a child needs help.275 If the child is sexually active, he or she
may be without adequate information about how to prevent pregnancy and
sexually transmitted diseases.276 Similarly, studies show that children
In many cases, a child will divulge information about his or her sexual
activities because the relationship between the child and parent is one in wich a
child feels secure m sharing information that might otherwise remain secret. In
these situations, the statute unposes aburden on parents who have developed close
relationslups with their children. One of the many advantages of cultivating trust
and encouraging communication is the assurance that one's child will seekparental
assistance in times of trouble. The statute effectively forecloses this option forboth
parent and child.
27 Teens want their parents' help. When asked about "the best way to delay
sexual activity and protect lads against AIDS and pregnancy," Debra Hafflier,
president of the nonprofit advocacy group Sexuality Information and Education
Council of the United States, responded: "Parental involvement works. If you
communicate openly and set clear limits, your children are more likely to abstain
and use contraceptives. Children want to hear from you on these issues." Pat
Wingert, How to Talk to Kids About Sex, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1999, at 80, 81.
276 Nearly half of lugh school students nationwide report that they need basic
information on birth control, IV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases;
274
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without parental guidance are more likely to become young sexual initiates
and that young sexual initiates without guidance are more likely to have
multiple partners. 2V Disclosing information about sexual conduct to the
parent of the child's partner or to the police may damage the parent-child
relationship even more severely by betraying the teen's confidence and
trust in the parent.278 Impeding communication between a parent and child
or, even more egregiously, injuring the parent-child relationship,
impermissibly invades the sanctity of the family and robs a parent of the
privilege andjoy of closeness with and the comfort of his or her children.27 9
Moreover, it damages the institution ofthe family in general and thus does
more harm to the social fabric than any amount of teenage sexual
experimentation. Tis sort of harm to the family runs counter to the
purpose of the statute to provide for the welfare of the adolescent and
280
positions the statute beyond the pale of constitutional protection.

nearly half are unaware that having asexually transmitted disease increases the risk
of getting HIV if sexually active. Press Release, The Kaiser Family Foundation,
Many Teens m the Dark About Sexual Health (Oct. 18,1999), http://www.kff.org/
content/1999/1548/teenfindings.htm. Forty percent of students would like more
information about where to get contraception; thirty percent would like more
information on how to use condoms. Id. Fifty-one percent would like more
information on where to go to get tested for HIV and other sexually transmitted
diseases. Id
2'A year-long campaign co-sponsored by Seventeen Magazine and the Katser
Family Foundation discovered that, among 1000 teens ages thirteen to nmeteen,
twenty-one percent had not discussed sex with their parents or guardians. Press
Release, Seventeen, Teen Sex Survey Results (June 2000), at http://newsl.
newstream.com (on file with author). Individuals comprising this twenty-one
percent were more likely to have sex at a younger age and with multiple partners.
Id. Thirty percent of the interviewees who were sexually active and were at least
fifteen years of age had had five or more partners. Id.
' Ths places a parent in the untenable situation of having to choose between
guarding the intimacy of the relationship with a child and the threat of
npnsonment and a criminal record. Aggressive prosecution ofsection 5/12-15(c)
infractions could also have an adverse inpact on the teen population it is designed
to protect. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000). Among
other things, it could discourage sexually active or pregnant adolescents from
seeking medical care ifthey fear being prosecuted under the criminal sexual abuse
statute or having to reveal the identity and age of their respective partners, who
might
then be charged under the statute.
279
See supra Part VA.2.

'0 Section 150/5.1 also appears to impose a heightened duty on parents who
have control over their children and thus seems to penalize parents who have
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iv. ConflictingStatutes
Placing section 150/5.1 alongside other Illinois. statutes that confer
rights on parents underscores the incongruity between the statutory method
and legislative goal. Adding to the Injustice of the statute itself, parental
liability for failing to prevent sexual intercourse among teenagers, when
contrasted with the parental right to assist a child in acquiring birth
control, 2s ' presents a curious, and potentially felonious, dilemma. On the
one hand, parents are required to take steps to ensure abstinence among
their teens. On the other hand, parents may wish to educate their teenagers
about and to protect them from the risks of unwanted pregnancies and
sexually transmitted diseases. The resulting message from parent to teen is
garbled and might read as follows: teenagers under the age of seventeen are
unable to consent to any sexual activity and thus should not get involved
in sexual relationslups; however, ifthe teen chooses to ignore this parental
caution and advice, the teen should protect hnselfor herself by using birth
control; if requested, the parent will help the teen obtain birth control;
nonetheless, the parent does not wish to be apprised of any ongoing or
upcoming sexual conduct for fear of criminal prosecution and felony
conviction. The last segment of these confusing legislative directives robs
both parent and child of their respective rights of childrearing and parental
guidance and smacks of the controversy surrounding the current debate
between advocates of abstinence-only education and those who favor
sexual education that includes "safe-sex" components or condom availability programs.'

developed a sense of closeness and respect for authority m their homes. See 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/5.1 (West Supp. 2000).
21 See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1 (West 1993) ("Birth control services
and information may be rendered by doctors licensed m Illinois to practice
medicine m all of its branches to any minor
who has the consent of Is parent
or legal guardian."). In 1972, the United States Supreme Court expanded the
privacy right articulated mGnswoldandstruck down avanety ofstate prohibitions
on the sale or distribution of contraceptives to single adults. Eisenstadt v Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972). Five years later, the Court further enhanced
individual autonomy when it invalidated a New York law prohibiting the sale of
contraceptives to mnors under sixteen and forbidding anyone who was not a
licensed pharmacist from selling even nonprescription contraceptives to persons
over fifteen. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977).
' According to arecentpoll by the Alan GuttmacherInstitute, abstinence is the
sole contraception method taught at one-third of all U.S. public schools. Jarrell,
supranote 1.Public health experts are concerned that the abstinence-only programs
"could undo a decade of progress in education about safe sex." Morse, supranote
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Joining the fray and elevating it to a fracas is the parental right to
object to a child's participation in any class or course in sex education? 3
The statute codifying this right appreciates the fundamental nature of the
parental right to bring up children. 2" Helping one's children prepare for
mature sexual relationships is a parent's prerogative, and decisions about
the extent and timing of sexual education are exclusively within the
province ofparental prudence. When lifted from print andput into practice,
these three parental rights and duties-the respective rights to help a minor
child obtain birth control and to determine the particulars ofa minor child's
sexual education, and the duty to prevent minor teenagers from engaging
m sexual conduct-become entangled. This squabbling triumvirate
simultaneously defers to and disrespects the parental privilege of raising
children, binding the hands of parents and leaving children bereft of their
25
inherent right to the counsel of their parents. 8
In summary, the use of criminal statutes against parents of sexuallyactive teenagers is too intrusive a method for achieving state goals. 6

10, at 80. Debra Haffner, president of the Sexuality Information and Education
Council of the United States, warns, "Denying
[teens] information about
contraception and STD protection puts them at risk." Id.
211 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-9.1(a) (West 1998) ("No pupil shall be
required to take or participate in any class or course in comprehensive sex
education if his parent or guardian submits written objection thereto, and refusal
to take or participate in such course or program shall not be reason for suspension
or expulsion of such pupil.").
See supraPart V.A.2.
Statutes that are not narrowly tailored may be struck for overbreadth. In
Johnsonv. City ofOpelousas,the Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated
a curfew ordinance that violated associational rights because it made no provision
for protected activities such as attending school meetings and religious functions.
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. UnitA Oct. 1981).
26 Valid state statutes already exist to punish parents who abuse or neglect their
children or who allow others to abuse their children. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 130/2 (West 1993) (puishing a parent for contributing to the
dependency or neglect of a child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378 (Supp. 2000)
(punishing aparentwho knowingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse
of a child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7115 (West Supp. 2000) (punishing a
parent who knowingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child);
W VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-5 (Michie Supp. 2000) (punishing a parent who
knowingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child).
Additionally, courts may terminate the parental rights of parents who sexually
abuse, or permit sexual abuse of, their children. See Mary J. Cavins, Annotation,
SexualAbuse of Child by Parentas Groundfor Termination ofParent'sRight to
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Although Illinois may have a compelling interest m preventing child abuse
and neglect, no evidence suggests that policing parental behavior in
situations similar to that found in the Maness case achieves that end.
Factors other than parental control may be more significant causes of the
child's behavior. Identifying all of the variables that underlie teenage
sexual conduct would be a formidable task; isolating the most culpable
causes would be impossible. The statute as applied to consensual sexual
activity among adolescents fails strict scrutiny because the means do not

closely fit the end.
VI. CONCLUSION

By relying on the application of its crinmal parental responsibility
statute to reduce teenage sexual activity, the Illinois General Assembly
attempted to avoid the tough issues surrounding the changing sexual
7
customs of our society 21
Initiatives to decrease teenage sexual activity
cannot succeed without a general reassessment of the attitudes and mores
regarding adolescent sexuality in the United States. Adolescent curiosity
about sex is well-fed-rn the schoolyard, on the bus, in the media, and at
home when no adult is watching. 88 If the threat of criminal sanctions for
sexually active teens does not deter their sexual activity, 9 the threat of

Child, 58 A.L.R.3d 1074, 1075 (1974) (collecting cases m which "courts have
considered the propriety of termiating the parental rights of parents who have
sexually abused, or permitted sexual abuse of, their children").
2I7 Many people worry that teenage nonchalance
toward sex will lead to the
"desecration of love and the subversion of mature relationslps." Stodghill, supra
note 4, at 54. As stated by Debra Haffher, president of the Sexuality Information
and Education Council of the United States: "We should not confuse kids' pseudosophistication about sexuality and their ability to use the language with their
understanding ofwho they are as sexualyoung people or their ability to make good
decisions." Id.
28 A telephone poll taken for Time/CNN reveals the wellsprings of teenage
information about sex: in 1998, forty-five percent ofteens primarily looked to their
friends for information, twenty-nine percent relied on television programs, seven
percent sought help from their parents, and three percent depended upon sexuality
education classes. Id. (citing Time/CNN poll, Apr. 8-9, 2000, conducted by
Yankelovich Partners, Inc.).
219 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West Supp. 2000)
(crmnalizing sexual conduct among adolescents who are at least thirteen years of
age but under seventeen years of age). In a similar vem, there is scant evidence that
enforcing statutory rape laws will affect the sexual behavior of teenagers. See
generally Hollenberg, supra note 212, at 274-76 (discussing the development of
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criminal penalties directed at parents will not likely hold much sway
Placing responsibility on parents to prevent adolescent sexual activity,
when juxtaposedwith the inundation of our youths by a seemingly constant
barrage of multimedia information laced with sexual content is not only
misguided and futile, but also a frivolous waste of the precious right of
parents to raise their children.
Parental responsibility statutes like the Illinois law impermissibly
violate the constitutional guarantee of privacy in family matters. 29
Although lawmakers cannot disregard the problem ofunconcerned parents
who allow their children to be abused, punising parents who fail to take
measures to prevent their teens from engaging m sexual activity treads too
far afield from any compelling state interest in safeguarding the welfare of
children. State authority must end at the point at which parents are making
childrearing decisions. Helping young people prepare for mature sexual
relationships is a family affair.

specialized statutory rape prosecution programs and evaluating the effectiveness
of such programs with respect to preventing teenage pregnancy). "The vague
possibility of being prosecuted is a slim deterrent for those involved in agedisparate relationships when compared to the powerful psychological and
economic
motivations for pursuing such relationships." Id. at 277
290
See supra Part V.B.1.

